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Abstract  
There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people’s actions are 
contingent on these others’ information. This paper defines and applies a new equilibrium concept in 
games with private information, cursed equilibrium, which assumes that each player correctly 
predicts the distribution of other players’ actions, but  underestimates the degree to which these 
actions are correlated with these other players’ information. We apply the concept to common-
values auctions, where cursed equilibrium captures the widely observed phenomenon of the 
winner’s curse. We also show how cursed equilibrium predicts other empirically observed 
phenomena, such as trade in adverse-selection settings where conventional analysis predicts no 
trade, and "naïve" voting in elections and juries where rational-choice models predict that voters 
fully take into account the informational content in being pivotal. 
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A widely observed phenomenon in laboratory auctions is the ￿winner￿s curse￿: when bidders who
share a common but unknown value for a good have private information about the good￿s value,
they tend to bid more than equilibrium theory predicts. In many experiments, the average winning
bid exceeds the average value of the good. One explanation for this phenomenon is that the typical
bidder fails to fully appreciate that the low bids by other bidders needed for her to win the auction
mean that these other bidders￿ private information is more negative than her own. This failure
leads the bidder to believe that the value of the object when she wins the auction is closer to the
value suggested by her private information than it actually is, and hence to overbid. Fully rational
bidders avoid this problem by tempering their bids.
While the winner￿s curse has been observed repeatedly in laboratory experiments, and anecdotes
and some research suggests that it is important outside of the laboratory, theoretical research on
auctions assumes that people do not make this error.1 Indeed, empirical researchers base their
estimations of bidders￿ valuations for the object being auctioned on the presumption that bidders do
not make this error.2 Kagel and Levin (1986) and others in the context of common-values auctions,
as well as Holt and Sherman (1994) in the context of trade with adverse selection, have posited and
tested an extreme form of the winner￿s curse: agents act as if there is no information content in
winning an auction or completing a trade.3 In this paper, we formally model a generalization of the
winner￿s curse which assumes that players in a Bayesian game underestimate the extent to which
other players￿ actions are correlated with their information. Our model generalizes those of Kagel
and Levin (1988) and Holt and Sherman (1994) both by allowing players to partially, but not fully,
appreciate the information content in other players￿ actions, and by de￿ning a solution concept
applicable to general Bayesian games. We ￿esh out the implications of our model in common-
values auctions and many other settings, discussing the empirical evidence that motivates it in
the speci￿c contexts we consider. The model ties together a wide range of empirically observed
phenomena with a formalization of a single psychological principle ￿ the underappreciation of the
informational content of the behavior of others.
1See Thaler (1988) for an overview of the early evidence on the winner￿s curse as well as Kagel (1995) for a survey
of laboratory auctions.
2In fact, when ￿winner￿s curse￿ appears in the title of a paper, it typically refers to the study of players who avoid
rather than succumb to the curse. Just as suburban housing developments are often named after the bit of nature
obliterated to create them (￿Forest Glen￿), so too the term winner￿s curse is typically used to describe what isn￿t
there.
3Potters and Wit (1995) and Jacobsen, Potters, Schram, van Winden, and Wit (2000) use this same premise
analyze markets for assets whose values are common but unknown to the traders.
1In Section 2 we present our equilibrium concept. We consider standard Bayesian games where
players￿ private information is represented by their ￿types,￿ whose joint distribution is common
knowledge. Our equilibrium concept, cursed equilibrium, assumes that each player incorrectly
believes that with positive probability each pro￿le of types of the other players plays the average
action of what all types of other players are playing, rather than their true, type-speci￿ca c t i o n .
Players choose their actions to maximize their expected utilities given their types and these incorrect
beliefs about other players￿ equilibrium strategies. We parameterize the extent to which a player is
￿cursed￿ by the probability χ ∈ [0,1] she assigns to other players playing their average action rather
than their type-contingent strategy. Setting χ =0corresponds to the fully rational Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, and setting χ =1corresponds to the case where each player assumes no connection
whatsoever between other players￿ actions and their types. Whatever χ, each player correctly
predicts the equilibrium distribution of the other players￿ actions ￿ the players￿ only mistake
comes in misunderstanding the relationship between other players￿ types and their actions.
To illustrate cursed equilibrium, consider a simple variant of Akerlof￿s (1970) lemons model in
which a buyer might purchase a car from a seller at a predetermined price of $1,000.T h e s e l l e r
knows whether the car is a lemon, worth $0 to both the seller and buyer, or a peach, worth $3,000
to the buyer and $2,000 to the seller. The buyer believes each occurs with probability 1
2.T h e
parties simultaneously announce whether they wish to trade, and the car is sold if and only if both
say they wish to trade. While a fully rational buyer would realize that the seller will sell if and
only if the car is a lemon, and hence refuse to buy, a cursed buyer may mistakenly buy the car.
T h es u r es a l eo ft h el e m o ni saχ-cursed equilibrium because a χ-cursed buyer believes that with
probability χ the seller sells irrespective of the type of car, so that the car being sold is a peach
with probability with (1 − χ) • 0+χ • 1
2 =
χ
2, and therefore worth
χ
2 • 3,000 = 1,500χ. Hence, a
buyer cursed by χ > 2
3 will buy the car, only to discover that whenever the seller is willing to sell
it is a worthless lemon.
We prove that every ￿nite game has (for every value of χ) a cursed equilibrium ￿ by observing
that a cursed equilibrium corresponds to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a modi￿ed game where the
players￿ payoﬀs for each action and type pro￿le are a weighted average of their actual payoﬀsa n d
their average payoﬀs for that action pro￿le averaged over other players￿ types. We also show that
when each player￿s payoﬀs are fully independent of other players￿ types, cursed equilibrium and
Bayesian Nash equilibrium coincide. Intuitively, the only diﬀerence between the two equilibrium
concepts is that in a cursed equilibrium players have incorrect beliefs about the relationship between
2their opponents￿ actions and their types; if no player￿s payoﬀsd e p e n do na n yo t h e rp l a y e r ￿ st y p e ,
then such mistaken beliefs do not matter. Finally, we de￿ne a perfectly-cursed equilibrium,t h e
analogue to Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and show how it imposes an important restriction on
players￿ beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path.
In Sections 3, 4, and 5, we apply the general model to three diﬀerent important settings ￿
bilateral trade, auctions, and voting. Our model both helps to explain existing experimental be-
havior in these settings and provides plausible, testable predictions in settings for which we know
of no experimental evidence. In Section 3 we examine adverse selection and no-trade theorems in
the context of bilateral trade. When, as in the example above, a seller has private information
about the value of a good, while the buyer does not, cursed equilibrium may lead to more trade
than Bayesian Nash equilibrium: when only sellers with low-value goods sell, a buyer who fails to
recognize this may buy when she would be better oﬀ not buying. But cursed equilibrium may also
lead to less trade than Bayesian Nash equilibrium: because a cursed buyer does not fully appreciate
that sellers with high-value goods sell at high prices, she may be too reluctant to pay higher prices.
We show that the predictions of cursed equilibrium approximately correspond to the behavior of
subjects in experimental tests of a lemons model by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) and Holt and
Sherman (1994). We also illustrate how in a setting with two-sided private information and com-
mon preferences, both parties may strictly prefer trading to not trading, in contrast to ￿no-trade
results￿ such as those presented in Milgrom and Stokey (1982). This is because a buyer or seller
who underinfers the other party￿s information conditional on trade may agree to a trade with a
negative expected value.
In Section 4 we turn to our primary motivating application, common-values auctions. In a
cursed equilibrium, bidders in a symmetric equilibrium do not recognize that they win the auction
only when they have the most positive information about the value of the object. When χ and
the number of bidders are high enough, this leads to the winner￿s curse ￿ the average winning bid
exceeds the average value of the object. Even though cursed bidders may suﬀer the winner￿s curse,
while rational bidders never do, we show that cursedness does not always raise the seller￿s expected
revenue, because cursed bidders may also sometimes bid less than rational bidders. Finally, we
compare the predictions of cursed equilibrium to some of the experimental evidence on common-
values auctions.
In Section 5 we apply cursed equilibrium to a model of voting, contrasting our predictions to
those of a recent rational-choice literature on voting in elections and on juries. This literature
3assumes that people vote with a sophisticated understanding that they should predicate their votes
on being pivotal, which means a voter should vote not based on her beliefs at the time of voting,
but rather based on what her beliefs would be if her vote decided the election. Just as in bidding,
therefore, voters must predict the relationship between other voters￿ private information and their
votes. We show that because of this underinference, cursed voters are more likely to vote ￿naively￿
according to their beliefs at the time of voting. This, in turn, implies that in contrast to the
rational-choice literature, voting rules in large elections matter in a cursed equilibrium: whereas
uncursed voters adjust their behavior to the voting rule to assure the eﬃcient outcome, suﬃciently
cursed voters do not react to voting rules, so that rules are eﬃcient if and only if they implement
the right outcome when voters vote naively. We also discuss whether cursed equilibrium can help
explain McKelvey and Palfrey￿s (1998) ￿ndings in their experimental test of jury voting.
In Section 6, we illustrate the implications of cursed equilibrium in two diﬀerent signaling con-
texts. First, we consider classical simple signaling games, where fully-cursed equilibrium rules out
the use of costly signaling, but lesser degrees of cursedness can either destroy meaningful signaling
arising in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium or facilitate meaningful signaling that could not arise in a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Second, we apply cursed equilibrium to a model of ￿veri￿able cheap
talk￿ modeled after American political elections where voters make inferences about candidates
after these candidates strategically reveal or conceal information about their past indiscretions or
future plans. In this game, one Bayesian Nash equilibrium is for each type of politician to reveal
her type, since any politician who knows the truth to be less damaging than fully rational voters
infer from silence prefers to reveal. Because cursed voters may not infer the worst from silence ￿
they may believe that even ￿good￿ types conceal ￿ even politicians with not-so-bad information
may not reveal the truth.
Because it posits that each player correctly predicts the equilibrium distribution of other players￿
actions without correctly predicting their type-contingent strategies, cursed equilibrium is incom-
patible with many natural explanations for how equilibrium play arises. In some settings, however,
we think this is a natural occurrence: a player who observes repeated play of a single game may
learn the distribution of other players￿ actions, but because she may never observe other play-
ers￿ private information she may not learn the relationship between the other players￿ actions and
private information. While we do not ￿nd this foundation for our approach fully satisfying, we
believe cursed equilibrium provides a useful, general, and relatively non-arbitrary way to study the
behavioral implications of a pervasive form of failure of contingent thinking.
4Our formulation of cursed equilibrium is an over-simpli￿cation in many other ways that may
limit its applicability beyond the set of games we consider. In some contexts, our formulation may
make some unrealistic predictions; in others, cursed equilibrium is not well-de￿ned. We conclude the
paper in Section 7 with a discussion of possible extensions of the notion of cursed equilibrium that
might cope with these problems, as well as discussing some possible further economic applications
of the principles developed in this paper.
2D e ﬁnition and General Results
Before developing speci￿c applications, in this section we formally de￿ne cursed equilibrium, prove
its existence in all ￿nite Bayesian games, and develop some general principles and results. Con-
sider a ￿nite Bayesian Game, G =( A1,...,A N;T0,T 1,...,T N;p;u1,...,u N), played by players
k ∈ {1,...,N}.A k is the ￿nite set of Player k￿s actions, where in a sequential game an action spec-
i￿es what Player k does at each of her information sets; Tk is the ￿nite set of Player k￿s ￿types￿,
each type representing diﬀerent information that Player k can have. For conceptual and notational
ease in our analysis below, we include a set of ￿nature￿s types￿, T0. T ≡ T0 ￿ T1 ￿ ... ￿ TN is the
set of type pro￿les, and p is the probability distribution over T, which we assume is common to all
players. Player k￿s payoﬀ function uk : A￿T → R depends on all players￿ actions A ≡ A1￿...￿AN
and their types. A (mixed) strategy σk for Player k speci￿es a probability distribution over actions
for each type: σk : Tk → 4Ak.L e tσk(ak|tk) be the probability that type tk plays action ak, and
let u ≡ (u1,...,u N).
The common prior probability distribution p puts positive weight on each tk ∈ Tk,a n dp fully
determines the probability distributions pk(t−k|tk),P l a y e rk￿s conditional beliefs about the types
T−k ≡ ￿
j6=k
Tj of other players (including nature) given her own type tk ∈ Tk.L e tA−k ≡ ￿
j6=0,k
Aj
be the set of action pro￿les for players j 6= k (excluding nature, who takes no action), and σ−k :
T−k → ￿
j6=0,k
4Aj be a strategy of Player k￿s opponents, where σ−k(a−k|t−k) is the probability that
type t−k ∈ T−k plays action pro￿le a−k under strategy σ−k(t−k).
The standard solution concept in such games is Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 As t r a t e g yp r o ￿le σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each Player k,e a c ht y p e
tk ∈ Tk,a n de a c ha∗
k such that σk(a∗
k|tk) > 0,
a∗








5In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each player correctly predicts both the probability distribution
over the other players￿ actions and the correlation between the other players￿ actions and types.
Before de￿ning cursed equilibrium, we de￿ne for each type of each player the average strategy






When Player k is of type tk, σ−k(a−k|tk) is the probability that players j 6= k play action pro￿le
a−k when they follow strategy σ−k. A player who (mistakenly) believes that each type pro￿le of the
other players plays the same mixed action pro￿le believes that the other players are playing σ−k(•|tk)
whenever they play σ−k(a−k|t−k). Note that σ−k(a−k|tk) depends on tk,s od i ﬀerent types of Player
k have diﬀerent beliefs about the average action of players j 6= k.L e t σ−k(tk):T−k → ￿
j6=0,k
4Aj
denote tk￿s beliefs about the average strategy of players j 6= k, namely σ−k(tk) is the strategy
players j 6= k would play if each type pro￿le t−k played a−k with probability σ−k(a−k|tk).
From this, we de￿ne a cursed equilibrium, de￿ned with respect to a parameter χ ∈ [0,1] that
measures the degree to which players misperceive the correlation between their opponents￿ actions
and types:
Deﬁnition 2 Am i x e d - s t r a t e g yp r o ￿le σ is a χ-cursed equilibrium if for each k, tk ∈ Tk,a n de a c h
a∗
k such that σk(a∗
k|tk) > 0,
a∗







[χσ−k(a−k|tk)+( 1− χ)σ−k(a−k|t−k)]uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k).
In a χ-cursed equilibrium, each player correctly predicts the probability distribution over her oppo-
nents￿ actions, but she misunderstands the relationship between her opponents￿ equilibrium action
pro￿le and their types. Each player plays a best response to beliefs that with probability χ her
opponents￿ actions do not depend on their types, while with probability 1 − χ their actions do
depend on their types.4 When χ =0 , χ-cursed equilibrium coincides with Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium. When χ =1 , each player entirely ignores the correlation between other players￿ actions and
4To see that each player correctly perceives the probability distribution over the other players￿ actions, note that








6their types. We refer to this extreme case as the fully-cursed equilibrium,a n dr e f e rt op l a y e r si na
fully-cursed equilibrium as fully cursed.
One important feature of χ-cursed equilibrium ￿ which complicates analysis ￿ is that a player￿s
perception of the strategy played by another player can depend on her own type, and two diﬀerent
players may have diﬀerent perceptions of the strategy played by a third player. This is impossible in
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, of course, since all types of all players correctly predict the strategies
of all types of all other players.5 When players￿ types are independent ￿ meaning that for each k,
each tk,t 0
k,t −k,p (t−k|tk)=p(t−k|t0
k) ￿t h e ni na n yχ-cursed equilibrium each type of Player k as
well as Players j and k share common beliefs about Player l￿s strategy. In many of our applications,
however, players￿ types are not independent, so that diﬀerences in beliefs prevail in equilibrium.6
In many applications, it is both intuitive and convenient to think not in terms of a player￿s
beliefs about others￿ actions as a function of types, but rather in terms of a player￿s beliefs about
others￿ types as a function of their actions played. In discussing auctions, for instance, we often
think not in terms of which price each type of bidder bids, but rather which type of bidder bids a
given price. Let b ptk(t−k|a−k,σ−k) be type tk of Player k￿s beliefs about the probability of facing
type t−k of players j 6= k when they play action pro￿le a−k under strategy σ−k. The following
lemma inverts the de￿nition of χ-cursed equilibrium to characterize players￿ beliefs about other
players￿ types following their actions.7









When χ =0 , b ptk(t−k|a−k,σ−k)=
σ−k(a−k|t−k)
σ(a−k|tk) pk(t−k|tk):P l a y e r k correctly updates her beliefs
about the other players according to Bayes Rule. When χ =1 , b ptk(t−k|a−k,σ−k)=pk(t−k|tk):
5In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, diﬀerent players or diﬀerent types of a given player may have diﬀerent beliefs
about a third player￿s actions, since they may have diﬀerent beliefs about the likelihood of other players￿ types. But,
by de￿nition, all types of players have common and correct beliefs about others￿ type-contingent strategies.I n a
cursed equilibrium, diﬀerent players and types of players may have diﬀerent beliefs even about these strategies.
6For example, suppose that there are two possible states of the world, ω1 and ω2, and each player receives one of
two possible signals, s1 and s2,w h e r ePr[si|ωi] > Pr[si|ωj]. Suppose that in equilibrium each player takes action ai
if her signal is si. When she receives signal s1,P l a y e r1 thinks ω1 more likely than she did before receiving her signal,
and therefore she thinks it more likely that Player 2 also receives signal s1. I nb o t haB a y e s i a nN a s he q u i l i b r i u m
and a cursed equilibrium, a Player 1 with signal s1 thinks it more likely that Player 2 takes action a1 than a Player 1
with signal s1.I n a χ-cursed equilibrium, however, a Player 1 with signal s1 also thinks it more likely that Player 2
plays a1 when his signal is s2 because the average probability that Player 2 plays a1 is higher when Player 1￿s signal
is s1 than s2.
7All proofs are in the Appendix.
7Player k infers nothing about the other players￿ types from their actions. For intermediate values
of χ ∈ (0,1),P l a y e rk partially updates to think it more likely that she is facing type t−k when the
other players are playing a−k, but she does not fully update.
The following proposition demonstrates that in ￿nite games, where Bayesian Nash equilibria
exist, χ-cursed equilibria also exist.
Proposition 1 If G =( A,T,p,u) is a ￿nite Bayesian game, then for each χ ∈ [0,1], G has a
χ-cursed equilibrium.
The logic behind Proposition 1 is closely related to Lemma 1, and provides a guide for much of
our analysis. It is most easily exposited by considering a separating pure-strategy equilibrium,
where each type of each player plays a diﬀerent pure strategy; when tk observes the action a−k
played by types t−k, she believes she is facing t−k with probability 1 − χ + χpk(t−k|tk) and facing
t0
−k 6= t−k with probability χpk(t0
−k|tk). In a cursed equilibrium, Player k plays a best response to
these beliefs, which means that she acts as if her payoﬀ from playing action ak when facing action
a−k and type pro￿le t−k is
u
χ
k(ak,a −k;tk,t −k) ≡ (1 − χ)uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)+χ
X
t−k∈T−k
pk(t−k|tk) • uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k).
This is the χ-weighted average of her actual payoﬀ as a function of actions and types and her
￿average￿ payoﬀ as a function of actions and her own type, averaged over the other types of other
players. We prove Proposition 1 by noting that since a χ-cursed equilibrium in G =( A,T,p,u) is
equivalent to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the χ-virtual game G
χ ≡ (A,T,p,uχ),Ghas a cursed
equilibrium whenever G
χ has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use this reinterpretation and
alternative formalization of cursed equilibrium as the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G
χ repeatedly
below.
Proposition 1 follows from the fact that whenever G is ￿nite, G
χ is ￿nite, and ￿nite games have
at least one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Proposition 1 is of limited general interest, however. While
every game we consider in this paper has an equilibrium for each value of χ, most of the games
we consider have uncountably in￿nite type and action spaces, so Proposition 1 does not guarantee
existence in these games. Moreover, the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (χ =0 ) is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for the existence of a χ-cursed equilibrium for each χ ∈ (0,1]. However, the
counterexamples we have devised to show this involve games with discontinuous payoﬀs or non-
8compact action spaces, and we suspect that in well-behaved games where Bayesian Nash equilibria
exist cursed equilibria also exist.8
In a cursed equilibrium, a player maximizes her payoﬀs under the mistaken belief that other
players￿ actions depend less on their types than they actually do. We establish in Proposition 2
that if no player can learn anything about her expected payoﬀ from any action pro￿le by learning
any other player￿s type, then the set of cursed equilibria coincides with the set of Bayesian Nash
equilibria. To formally state the proposition, we need to distinguish between the set of Player k￿s
opponents and the set of possible states of the world. Let T−0k ≡ ￿
i6=0,k
Ti be the set of possible
types of all players i 6= k excluding nature, Player 0.L e t E [Uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)|tk] be Player k￿s
expectation of her payoﬀ when she plays action ak and the other players play action a−k, conditional
on her type tk; Uk is random because it may depend on t0 or t−0k.L e tE [Uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)|tk,t −0k]
be Player k￿s expectation of her payoﬀ when she plays action ak and the other players play action
a−k, conditional on her type tk and the other players￿ (excluding nature￿s) type t−0k.
Proposition 2 If for each Player k,e a c ht y p etk ∈ Tk,e a c ht y p ep r o ￿le t−0k ∈ T−0k,a n de a c h
action pro￿le (ak,a −k) ∈ A, E [Uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)|tk,t −0k]=E [Uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)|tk], then for
each χ ∈ [0,1] the set of χ-cursed equilibria coincides with the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria.
The condition that E [Uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)|tk,t −0k]=E [Uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k)|tk] not only requires that
no player￿s payoﬀ be aﬀected by any other player￿s type, but also that no player can learn anything
about her expected payoﬀ by learning any other player￿s type; this means essentially that (given
a player￿s type) other players￿ types are uncorrelated with the state of nature. This distinction is
crucial in many of our applications. In a common-values auction, for instance, bidders may not
care about other bidders￿ signals per se, but only about the uncertain value of the object. But if
one bidder learned another bidder￿s signal her beliefs about the value of the object, and therefore
her beliefs about her payoﬀs from a pro￿le of bids, would change. Hence, Proposition 3 does
not apply to common-values auctions. But it does apply to private-values auctions, where each
bidder￿s payoﬀ is a deterministic function of her own type and the pro￿le of bids.
8Athey (1997) proves an existence theorem for in￿nite games satisfying a single-crossing property: if each player￿s
best response to every strategy of her opponents that is increasing in their types is increasing in her type (and payoﬀs
are continuous in actions), then the game has a pure-strategy equilibrium where each player￿s strategy is increasing
in her type. While space constraints prevent us from proving it in this paper, the same is true of cursed equilibrium:
a game that satis￿es Athey￿s conditions has an increasing, pure-strategy χ-cursed equilibrium for each value of χ.
(Likewise, Milgrom and Roberts￿ (1990) monotone-comparative-statics results for Nash equilibria in supermodular
games apply to cursed equilibria.)
9The intuition behind the proposition is that if a player learns nothing about her expected
payoﬀ from knowing the other players￿ types, then it does not matter that she misunderstands
the relationship between the other players￿ types and their actions. More precisely, a player who
correctly predicts the probability distribution over the other players￿ actions who does not learn
anything about her expected payoﬀ from learning the other players￿ types chooses the same action
irrespective of her theory of which types of the other players play which action.
A ￿nal result is of interest in some applications and helps give more intuition about the nature
of the cursed equilibrium. By analogy with pooling equilibria in simple signaling games, say that
as t r a t e g yp r o ￿le σ is pooling if for each player k there exists some ak ∈ Ak such that, for each
tk ∈ Tk, σ(ak|tk)=1 . Then:
Proposition 3 If a pooling strategy pro￿le σ is a χ-cursed equilibrium for some χ ∈ [0,1],t h e nσ
is a χ0-cursed equilibrium for each χ0 ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 3 implies that every ￿pooling￿ Bayesian Nash equilibrium ￿ meaning no player￿s
action depends on her type ￿ is a χ-cursed equilibrium for every value of χ, and any pooling
χ-cursed equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This is because in a pooling equilibrium
players￿ actions are independent of their types. Ignoring the relationship between others￿ actions
and their information is not a mistake when there is no relationship.
In many Bayesian games, especially sequential games, researchers apply re￿nements of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in making predictions. A simple way to de￿ne analogous re￿nements of χ-cursed
equilibrium is to de￿ne the re￿nement in the χ-virtual game introduced above. Of special interest
to us is the analogue of perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3 σ is a χ perfectly-cursed equilibrium of G if it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the χ-virtual game G
x.
Perfectly-cursed equilibrium can place restrictions on beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path, since
implicit in it is the requirement that beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path not be too extreme. In simple
signaling games, for instance, when χ =1perfect-cursedness imposes the restriction that the
receiver not update her beliefs after any message, whether or not it is sent in equilibrium. There
is no analog to Proposition 3 for perfectly-cursed equilibrium￿the set of perfectly-cursed pooling
10equilibria can depend on χ.9
Cursed equilibrium is the simplest way we can imagine to model players￿ underattentiveness to
the information content of other players￿ actions. There are several further potential extensions
and generalizations of the model that would make it potentially more realistic, but which we do not
consider in this paper. We could, for example, allow for diﬀerent degrees of sophistication between
players, or for diﬀerent degrees of sophistication for diﬀerent types of a given player. While we
discuss such re￿nements brie￿y in the conclusion, for the remainder of the paper we consider some
key applications of our simple variant of the model, relating our results when possible to existing
empirical evidence.
3T r a d e
In many economic exchanges, one party has private information about the value of the good she
might sell or buy that determines the price at which she is willing to trade. In this section we
￿esh out the implications of cursed equilibrium in such settings, with both one-sided and two-sided
asymmetric information. We show that trade both may take place when Bayesian Nash equilibrium
predicts no trade and may not take place when Bayesian Nash equilibrium predicts trade.
We begin by studying one-sided asymmetric information of the sort introduced in Akerlof￿s
(1970) lemons model, which we formalize along the lines of the model Samuelson and Bazerman
(1985) formulated in designing an experimental test. A ￿rm oﬀers itself for sale to a raider; the ￿rm
knows its book value, but the raider does not. The raider has correct priors that the book value
of the ￿rm is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Whatever its book value, the ￿rm values itself at its
book value, while the raider values the ￿rm at γ ≥ 1 times book value. The raider must make the
9The following sender-receiver game illustrates both the restriction that perfectly-cursed equilibrium imposes on
beliefs oﬀ of the equilibrium path and the fact that not every pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a perfectly-cursed
equilibrium. A sender is either type t1 or t2, each of which occurs with prior probability
1
2; the sender knows her
type, but the receiver does not. The sender chooses an action L or R. If the sender chooses R, then the game ends
and both types of sender and the receiver get a payoﬀ of 2. If the sender chooses L, then the receiver chooses between
U or D. If the receiver chooses U, both types of sender and the receiver get a payoﬀ of 4. If the receiver chooses
D, then both types of sender get 0, and the receiver gets −5 if he is facing t1 and 5 if he is facing t2. One perfect
Bayesian equilibrium is for both types of sender to go R, and the receiver to go D if he should have the opportunity
to move: going D makes sense for the receiver if he believes the deviation L comes from type t2 of the sender with a
probability of at least 9
10.F o r s u ﬃciently high χ, however, this is not a perfectly-cursed equilibrium. To see this,
note that if χ > 1
5, the receiver￿s perceived payoﬀ from facing type t2 of sender when he plays D in G
χ
is less than 4,
and therefore U dominates D. Perfectly cursed equilibrium imposes the restriction that the receiver￿s beliefs not be
too extreme oﬀ the equilibrium path. Intuitively, this corresponds to the restriction that cursed equilibrium imposes
on beliefs on the equilibrium path described in Lemma 1:i fP l a y e rk thinks that type t−k and t
0
−k are both possible,
then whenever χ > 0 no action by players j 6= k can convince Player k that she is facing t−k with probability one.
11￿rm an oﬀer, which the ￿rm then accepts or rejects; without loss of generality we take the raider￿s
oﬀer space to be [0,1]. The raider seeks to maximize her expected surplus, and the ￿rm accepts
any oﬀer above its book value.
Formally, there are two players F (￿rm) and R (raider), with TF ≡ [0,1]. The raider, who has
no private information, chooses a price b ∈ [0,1] at which she oﬀers to buy the ￿rm. The ￿rm
chooses a response policy a :[ 0 ,1] → {0,1}, where a(b)=1means that he accepts the raider￿s
oﬀer of b.T h e ￿rm￿s optimal strategy is clear: it sells at price b if and only if her type is less
than b. Given the uniform distribution of the ￿rm￿s type, therefore, the average value of the ￿rms
sold at price b is b






By familiar ￿lemons￿ logic, the lower the bid the lower the average value of the raider will get.
When γ < 2, the expected net return to the raider will be negative for any positive b, so the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome involves b =0 .W h e n γ > 2, the raider￿s expected pro￿ti s
positive whatever her bid, and it is maximized at b =1 .
What are the χ-cursed equilibria? One is that the ￿rm rejects all bids and the raider oﬀers zero;
this, however, is not perfectly cursed since the best response of some types of ￿rms to a positive
oﬀer is to accept. Henceforth we limit our attention to perfectly-cursed equilibria. Consider ￿rst
the extreme case where χ =1 , so the raider incorrectly thinks that the ￿rm￿s decision whether
to accept the oﬀer does not depend on its book value. Let σF(a) be the average (across types)




b 0dt = b, because ￿rms valued less
than b sell while those valued above b do not. In a fully cursed equilibrium, the raider thinks that





, which is maximized by b =
γ















32 < 0 for γ < 2.T h u st h er a i d e rs u ﬀe r sa￿ w i n n e r ￿ sc u r s e ￿ :
s h ed o e sn o tr e a l i z et h a tt h e￿rm only accepts her oﬀer when its value is low. The fact that the
raider thinks that some ￿rms with values above her bid will sell keeps her from lowering her bid to
zero.10




32 ,w h i c hi sl e s s
than
γ−2
2 ,h e rp a y o ﬀ from bidding b =1 . Cursedness leads to both overbidding when γ < 2 and
underbidding when γ > 2 for the same reason: a cursed buyer does fully appreciate the extent
to which raising her oﬀer raises the expected value of the goods she buys, and so she pays more
10Note that even when γ < 1, the cursed equilbrium involves b>0;e v e nt h o u g ht h er a i d e rknows that the ￿rm is
always worth less to her than to the ￿r m ,s h es t i l lm a k e sap o s i t i v eo ﬀer. Hence, despite it being common knowledge
that there are no gains from trade, players trade nonetheless. While we know of no evidence on this prediction and
this degree of error does not seem entirely implausible to us, it does seem somewhat unlikely.
12attention to how her bid aﬀects her probability of completing a trade than to how it aﬀects the
quality of the good she will get.
Now consider χ ∈ (0,1).I ft h er a i d e ro ﬀers b,a￿rm sells iﬀ its valuation is less than b. But in
a χ-cursed equilibrium, the raider thinks a ￿rm of type tF sells with probability
(1 − χ)σF(1|tF)+χσF(1) =
‰
1 − χ + χb for tF <b
χb for tF >b .
The raider thinks that with probability χ, the ￿rm accepts a bid b with probability b independent
of its type, and with probability 1 − χ,a￿rm accepts b iﬀ tF <b . Hence, the raider￿s perceived
expected surplus from bidding b is















which is maximized by b∗ =
χγ
4−2γ(1−χ). From this, it can be seen that ∂b∗
∂χ > 0 if and only if γ > 2,
which means that the buyer overpays when γ < 2 and underpays when γ > 2.
Existing experimental evidence on this model shows that subjects do bid positive amounts,
contradicting the Bayesian-Nash prediction of 0. But in fact they tend to bid in excess of the levels
predicted by even the fully-cursed equilibrium. When γ = 3
2, the fully cursed-equilibrium is b∗ = 3
8.
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) ￿nd that the majority of subjects make oﬀers in (0.5,0.75).B a l l ,
Bazerman, and Carroll (1991) allow subjects to learn by repeating the game twenty times, where
subjects learn their payoﬀs after every round. Such learning does not appreciably aﬀect average
bids, which over the course of the trials fall modestly from 0.57 to 0.55.
Holt and Sherman (1994) consider a variant of this model where the raider￿s priors on the value
of the ￿rm are distributed uniformly on [v0,v 0+r].I n a χ-cursed equilibrium, the raider￿s optimal













from whence b∗ =
2v0(γχ+1)+γχr
4−2γ(1−χ) .
Like in Samuelson and Bazerman￿s model, in Holt and Sherman￿s model a fully cursed raider
can either bid lower than, equal to, or higher than an uncursed raider, depending on the parameter
values. For each of the three combinations of γ,v 0,a n dr that Holt and Sherman tested in
laboratory experiments, Table 1 presents both the χ-cursed equilibrium values of b and subjects￿
average bid b.
13Table 1: Adverse Selection (from Holt and Sherman 1994)
Curse rv 0 γ b(χ) b(χ =0 ) b(χ =1 ) b
No curse 21 1 .52 2 2 2 .03
Winner￿s 4.51 .51 .5
45χ+12
4+12χ 33 .56 3.78
Loser￿s 0.50 .51 .5
9χ+4
4+12χ 10 .81 0.74
Holt and Sherman designed the ￿no-curse￿ treatment such that the fully-cursed equilibrium co-
incides with the Bayesian Nash equilibrium; as a result, bids do not depend on χ.I n t h i s c a s e ,
subjects bid quite close to the theoretical prediction. In the ￿winner￿s-curse￿ treatment, a fully-
cursed raider bids 3.56, while an uncursed raider bids 3. Subjects￿ average bid was 3.78, slightly
about the fully-cursed prediction. Finally, in the ￿loser￿s-curse￿ treatment, a fully-cursed raider
bids 0.81, an uncursed raider 1, and subjects 0.74. Thus, subjects￿ behavior is much closer to the
fully-cursed than the Bayesian-Nash prediction, although average bids depart too extremely from
Bayesian Nash equilibrium to be adequately described by cursed equilibrium.
We now turn to two-sided asymmetric information and show that trade can occur in a χ-cursed
equilibrium, even when it is common knowledge that the value of the good is identical for the two
parties￿so that Bayesian Nash equilibrium predicts no trade. While we know of no experimental
evidence in such a situation, our prediction of trade matches the common intuition that speculative
trade occurs when the no-trade theorems of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and others predict none.
Let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3} be the set of possible payoﬀ-relevant states of the world, where the two players
share the common prior ￿(ω1)=￿(ω2)=￿(ω3)=1
3. Suppose that Player 2 holds an asset which
pays k in state ωk, so that the higher the state the higher the value of the asset. Each player
has private information about the state of the world: Player 1 learns when the state is ω1, but
cannot diﬀerentiate between states ω2 and ω3; Player 2 learns when the state is ω3, but cannot
diﬀerentiate between states ω1 and ω2. The information partitions P1 = {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}} and
P2 = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}} represent Player 1 and Player 2￿s information, respectively; Pi is an element
of Player i￿s partition Pi. After each player receives her private information, Player 1 makes Player
2a no ﬀer for the asset which Player 2 then accepts or rejects.
The only possible trade that can occur in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is the
relatively meaningless one where the good is traded at price 2 in state ω2 and neither party expects
to bene￿t from the trade. For any χ ∈ (0,1], however, trade in which a party expects to gain can
occur in state ω2.L e t b1 : P1 → [1,3] denote Player 1￿s bidding strategy, and a2 : P2￿[1,3] → {0,1}
denote Player 2￿s acceptance strategy, where a2 =1means Player 2 accepts Player 1￿s bid. Each
14player￿s payoﬀ in state ωk is k if she holds the asset after trading plus or minus any transfer she
paid received or paid.
The following strategies are a cursed equilibrium with trade in state ω2:
b1(P1)=
‰
1 P1 = {ω1}
2 −
χ




1 P2 = {ω1,ω2},b 1 ≥ 2−
χ
2
0 P2 = {ω3} or b1 < 2 −
χ
2.
First note that trade cannot occur in states ω1 or ω3.T h e m o s t t h a t P l a y e r 1 is willing to oﬀer
in ω1 is 1, but because Player 2 puts positive probability on being in state ω2 when the state is ω2
whatever b1 ({ω2,ω3}), Player 2 rejects Player 1￿s oﬀer. In ω3, Player 2 will accept no less than
3, but Player 1 will not oﬀer 3 since Player 2 would accept that in state ω2. Now consider ω2.
As long as b1({ω1}) 6= b1({ω2,ω3}), Player 2 thinks the probability of being in state ω2 given he
receives the bid b1({ω2,ω3}) is 1−
χ











If Player 2 accepts Player 1￿s oﬀer in state ω2, then given that he rejects it in ω3,P l a y e r1 thinks
that when her oﬀer is accepted the probability of being in ω2 is 1−
χ
2, and thus the expected value










2. Hence Player 1 strictly prefers to trade, and she oﬀers
2 −
χ
2, the lowest price at which Player 2 is willing to trade.
In this example, trade in ω2 occurs in a cursed equilibrium because neither player suﬃciently
updates her beliefs about the value of the object given the willingness of the other player to trade.
In the information structure given, Player 1 is overly optimistic about the value of the object based
on her private information alone when it turns out that the state is ω2. But whereas an uncursed
trader would learn from Player 2￿s willingness to trade at a low price that the state is ω2,ac u r s e d
trader remains overoptimistic that the state is ω3.11
While trade only occurs one third of the time in the example, it is easy to see that whatever
the probability of ω2, so long as both ω1 and ω3 both occur with positive probability, trade can
occur. Since cursed equilibrium is consistent with speculative trade ￿ where at least one player
strictly prefers trading to not trading ￿ with probability arbitrarily close to one, a natural question
is whether it is consistent with speculative trade with probability one. It is not. To see why,
11While in this trading mechanism Player 1 bene￿ts from trade, there exist other trading mechanisms under which
Player 2 gains. It is also not important to the example that both players are cursed: trade will occur in state ω2 if
only one of the two players is cursed. This follows from the fact that when Player 1 makes Player 2 an oﬀer, Player
2 thinks that the probability of being in state ω2 is less than one, so he will accept some oﬀer suﬃciently close to,
but below, 2 when he is cursed. If Player 1 is cursed, she thinks that the probability of being in ω2 given that her
oﬀer is accepted is less than one, and hence she is willing to oﬀer more than 2,w h i c hP l a y e r1 will accept.
15consider again the trading mechanism described in our example where Player 1 makes Player 2 an
oﬀer, and suppose that both players are fully cursed. If Player 2 always accepts Player 1￿s oﬀer,
then Player 1 learns nothing about the value of the object from the fact that they are trading, and
therefore she can oﬀer no more than her expectation of the asset￿s value at any of her information
sets. If she strictly prefers trading at some information set, then she must oﬀer less than her
expectation of the value of the object at that information set, and therefore her average oﬀer
(across all information sets) must be less than the asset￿s expected value. Likewise, since Player
2 is fully cursed, he infers nothing from Player 1￿s oﬀer, and hence at each of his information sets
he must be oﬀered more than his expectation of the asset￿s value. If he strictly prefers trading at
some information set, then he must be oﬀered more than his expectation of the asset￿s value, and
thus Player 1￿s average oﬀer must exceed the expected value of the asset, a contradiction. When
players a cursed, but not fully cursed, essentially the same argument applies.
4 Common-Values Auctions
In this section, we use an example to illustrate the implications of cursed equilibrium in ￿rst- and
second-price auctions. Under either auction format in our example, the more cursed are bidders,
the higher they bid, and when the number of bidders is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hc u r s e db i d d e r ss u ﬀer the
winner￿s curse ￿ the average winning bid exceeds the average value of the object. We show that
second-price auctions raise more expected revenue than ￿rst-price auctions with cursed bidders,
just as with rational bidders. However, unlike with rational bidders, as cursed bidders￿ information
about the value of the object becomes more precise, the seller￿s expected revenue may fall, so a
seller may have incentive to hide information about the value of the object from cursed bidders.
Finally, we provide an example of a common-values auction where cursed bidders bid less than
uncursed bidders. In the ￿nal part of this section, we discuss some of the experimental literature
on common-values auctions in relation to cursed equilibrium.
In a common-values auction, the value of the object being auctioned is common but unknown to
all bidders. In our example, we assume bidders receive signals that are independent and identically
distributed conditional on the common value of the object. Bidders are risk neutral, and a bidder￿s
utility from winning the auction is simply the value of the object, s, minus the price she pays, p;
her utility from losing the auction is zero. Throughout this section, we use capital letters to denote
random variables and lower-case letters to denote values these random variables take on. In order
16to analyze cursed equilibrium in common-values auctions, we use the χ-virtual game introduced in
Section 2 where Bidder i￿s utility from winning the auction at price p when the value of the object
is s is
(1 − χ)s + χE[S|Xi = xi] − p,
where xi is the value of Bidder i￿s signal about the value of the object. That is, Bidder i￿s valuation
of the object is the χ-weighted average of the object￿s actual value and her expectation of its value
conditional on her signal.
Suppose that n bidders share a common prior on the value of the object. We follow Klemperer￿s
(1999) example and assume that value of the object, S, is distributed uniformly on the real line,






for some a>0.12 Three
functions that play an important role in our analysis merit de￿nition here: Y n
i (1) is the highest
signal among bidders j 6= i; r(xi) ≡ E[S|Xi = x] is Bidder i￿s expectation of the value of the object
conditional on her signal Xi = x;a n dvn(x,y) ≡ E[S|Xi = x,Y n
i (1) = y] is Bidder i￿s expectation
of the value of the object conditional on her signal being x and the highest of the other bidders￿
signals being y.
We say that a bidder suﬀers the winner￿s curse in a given equilibrium of a given auction if the
bidder￿s expected surplus from entering the auction is negative; that is, the expectation of the value
of the object less the price, both conditional on the event that she wins, is negative. In order that
our de￿nition apply across auction settings, we parameterize auctions by Pn, the price the winner
pays when she wins the n-bidder auction; for example, in a ￿rst-price auction, Pn is the winner￿s
bid.
Deﬁnition 4 Bidder i suﬀers the winner￿s curse in equilibrium (bi,b −i) of the n-bidder auction if
E[(S − Pn)1 {bi(Xi)>maxj6=i bj(Xj)}] < 0.13
Under our de￿nition, a bidder suﬀers the winner￿s curse if the expected value of the object
conditional on winning is less than the price conditional on winning. In a symmetric equilibrium
of a symmetric model, Bidder i suﬀers the winner￿s curse if E[S] <E [Pn], namely if the expected
12While the uniform distribution over the real line is not de￿ned, it can be thought of as the limit of the uniform
distribution on [−K,K] as K →∞ . When the value of the object is negative, the auction corresponds to a
procurement auction where the seller pays the winner to perform some costly activity. For the purposes of the
example, however, all that matters is that the bidders￿ beliefs about S as a function of their signals are uniform. For
a more thorough analysis of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this model, see Klemperer (1999).
131{A} is the indicator function that takes on the value one when A occurs and zero otherwise.
17price exceeds the expected value of the object.14
We begin our analysis with second-price auctions, where the highest bidder wins the auction and
pays the second-highest bid. Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the second-price auction in this setting is bi(xi)=vn(xi,x i) ￿B i d d e ri bids her expectation of
the value of the object conditional on both her signal and the highest of the other bidders￿ signals
being xi. To see that this is an equilibrium, suppose that bidders j 6= i follow their proposed




(vn(xi,y) − vn(y,y))fY n
i (1)(y|Xi = xi)dy,
where fY n
i (1)(y|Xi = xi) is the density of Y n
i (1) conditional on Xi = xi.I t i s e a s y t o s h o w t h a t
vn(xi,y) is increasing in xi, which implies that the integrand is positive if and only if xi >y . Hence,
Bidder i￿s expected utility is maximized when b−1
j (bi)=xi,o rbi = bj(xi). Intuitively, Bidder i￿s bid
does not aﬀect the price she pays when she wins, only which auctions she wins. If the other bidders
follow their equilibrium strategies, then the only eﬀect of raising her bid above vn(xi,x i) is for
Bidder i to win some auctions where yn
i (1) >x i;b u ti nt h a tc a s evn(xi,yn
i (1)) <v n(yn
i (1),yn
i (1)).
In words, by raising her bid above vn(xi,x i), Bidder i can only win auctions she would prefer to
lose. Likewise, by lowering her bid, Bidder i can only lose auctions she would prefer to win.
In the χ-virtual game corresponding to the second-price auction, Bidder i￿s expectation of the
value of the object conditional on her signal being xi and the highest of the other bidders￿ signals
being y is
E {(1 − χ)S + χE[S|Xi = xi]|Xi = xi,Yn
i (1) = y} =( 1− χ)vn(xi,y)+χr(xi).
Because r(xi) and vn(xi,y) are both increasing in xi, the expression is increasing in xi, and therefore
we can use the same argument as Milgrom and Weber to show that bi(xi)=( 1 −χ)vn(xi,x i)+χr(xi)
is a χ-cursed equilibrium of the second-price auction. Here, rather than bid her expectation of the
value of the object conditional on her signal being both the highest and second-highest, Bidder i
bids the χ-weighted average of that and her expectation of the value of the object conditional on
her signal alone. Intuitively, the second part of Bidder i￿s bidding function re￿ects the fact that
she thinks that there may be no information content in winning.
14Our de￿nition of the winner￿s curse is not the only reasonable one. A more liberal de￿nition would be that
ab i d d e rs u ﬀers the winner￿s curse if her expected surplus from entering the auction is less than Nash-equilibrium
analysis suggests. We use our de￿nition because it emphasizes the severity of overbidding and matches the folk
wisdom that winning bids in common-values auctions tend to exceed the value of the object.




2,x i + a
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⁄
, and so her expected value of the object conditional on her signal, r(xi),i sxi.
Bidder i￿s posteriors on S given that Xi = Y n
i (1) = xi are given by
hn(s|Xi = xi,Yn
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i￿s expectation of the value of the object conditional on her signal being both the highest and
second highest on the n bidders￿ signals is vn(xi,x i)=xi − a
2 + a
n. Thus, the symmetric χ-cursed
equilibrium in the second-price auction is




When n =2 , Bayesian Nash and cursed equilibrium coincide.15 For n ≥ 3, bids are increasing
in χ for every signal value, so the seller￿s revenue is also increasing in χ.F o r χ < 1,b i d sa r e
decreasing in n, but the higher χ, the slower bids decrease as n increases. For a given s,t h e
expected second-highest signal E[Y n(2)|S = s]=s − a
2 + n−1
n+1a, and the seller￿s expected revenue
in the n-bidder auction is







The seller￿s expected revenue is increasing in n for all χ,a n da sn →∞it approaches s + χa
2 >s ,




2χ ,t h e
seller￿s expected revenue exceeds s and bidders suﬀer the winner￿s curse. When χ =1 , for example,
n =3 , meaning that bidders suﬀer the winner￿s curse whenever n ≥ 4.A s χ → 0,t h eχ-cursed
equilibrium approaches the Bayesian Nash equilibrium where, of course, bidders never suﬀer the
winner￿s curse; in this case, n →∞ .
An implication of the winner￿s curse is that by committing to a policy of revealing information
about the value of the object, the seller may lower her expected revenue. This contrasts Bayesian-
Nash analysis, where improving rational bidders￿ information about the value of the object mitigates
bidders￿ fear of the winner￿s curse and hence intensi￿es the competitiveness of their bidding, raising
the seller￿s expected revenue. In our model, as a increases, each bidder￿s private information about
15When n =2 , r(xi)=v
n(xi,x i), since a bidder learns nothing about the value of the object by learning that the
other bidder￿s signal is lower than her own; intuitively, for each value of s ∈
£
xi − a
2,x i + a
2
⁄
is the probability that
Xj <x i equal to one half. This result depends on the particular functional forms of our example, and in general
Bayesian Nash and cursed equilibria can diﬀer in two-bidder common-value auctions.
19the value of the object becomes noisier, so that increasing a can be thought of as making bidders
less informed. When χ =0 , increasing a causes bidders to lower their bids enough that the seller￿s
expected revenue falls. When χ > χ ≡
2(n−1)
(n−2)(n+1), however, increasing a lowers bids but increases
the seller￿s revenue. For example, when n =4 , the seller￿s revenue is increasing in a whenever
χ > 3
5.A s n →∞ , χ → 0,s oi n c r e a s i n ga always leads to an increase in the seller￿s revenue,
no matter slight bidders￿ cursedness. The winner￿s curse is one implication of this result. When
a =0 , bidders know the value of the object with certainty, so the seller￿s expected revenue is the
value of the object. For large n,i n c r e a s i n ga increases the seller￿s revenue, so bidders suﬀer the
winner￿s curse for a>0.16
One natural question is whether the seller￿s expected revenue is always increasing in χ.S i n c e
bi(xi)=( 1− χ)vn(xi,x i)+χr(xi) is the χ-cursed equilibrium of the general second-price auction,
the seller￿s expected revenue is increasing in χ whenever E[r(Y n(2)] >E[vn(Y n(2),Yn(2)],n a m e l y
when the expectation of the second-highest signal holder￿s expectation of the value of the object
conditional on her signal alone is higher than the expectation of the second-highest signal holder￿s
expectation of the value of the object conditional on her signal being the highest and second-highest.
In our example, r(xi)=xi and vn(xi,x i)=xi − a
2 + a
n <x i, so the seller￿s expected revenue does
not depend on χ for n =2and is increasing in χ for n>2. But consider another example where
s,xi ∈ {0,1}, Pr[S =0 ]=P r [ S =1 ]=1
2,a n dPr[Xi =0 |S =0 ]=1
2 and Pr[Xi =0 |S =1 ]=0 .
When the value of the object is low, both signals are equally likely, but when the value of the object
is high, the high signal occurs with probability one. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a bidder with
16As an alternative illustration that the seller may prefer withholding information from the bidders, suppose that,







. Before receiving her
signal, the seller chooses between truthfully revealing and concealing her signal, whatever it is. Milgrom and Weber
(1982) show that when bidders are rational the seller prefers truthful revelation. When bidders are cursed, the
χ- c u r s e de q u i l i b r i u mi nt h ea u c t i o nw h e nt h es e l l e rr e v e a l si se b
n(xi,z)=( 1−χ)e v
n(xi,x i,z)+e r(xi,z).T h e f u n c t i o n
e v
n(xi,x i,z) is the analogue to v
n(xi,x i) when the seller￿s signal is z,a n de r(xi,z) i st h ea n a l o g u et or(xi) when the
seller￿s signal is z. It is easy to show that for all xi and z, e v
n(xi,x i,z)=v
n(xi,x i): intuitively, if a bidder has beliefs








when her signal and the highest of other signals is xi, then because every value of s is
equally likely to generate the signal z,l e a r n i n gz does cause the bidder to update her beliefs. But whereas r(xi)=xi,
e r(xi,z)=
1
2 (xi + z): a bidder￿s expectation of the value of the object conditional on the two signals (xi,z) is simply








n2 + n− 4
4n(n +1 )
.
By concealing her signal, the seller achieves the same expected revenue as when she has no signal. When n =2 , the
seller￿s expected revenue is larger than when she has no signal because E [e r(Y
n(2),Z)|S = s] >E[r(Y
n(2))|S = s],
since Y
n(2) is on average less than Z.W h e n n =3 , the seller￿s expected revenue does not depend on whether
she reveals her signal because E [e r(Y
n(2),Z)|S = s]=E [r(Y
n(2))|S = s], since Y
n(2) is on average equal to Z.
However, for n ≥ 4, the seller￿s expected revenue is lower than when she has no signal because E [e r(Y
n(2),Z)|S = s] <
E [r(Y
n(2))|S = s], since Y
n(2) is on average greater than Z. Thus, with enough bidders the seller decreases her
expected revenue by committing to a policy of truthfully revealing her signal.
20xi =0knows the object is worth zero, and thus b(0) = 0.A b i d d e r w i t h s i g n a l xi =1knows
that if xj =0 , the object is worth zero and her payoﬀ is zero whatever she bids. If xi = xj =1 ,
then the expected value of the object is 4
5, and thus b(1) = 4
5.W h e n χ =1 ,w eb(0) = 0 and
b(1) = 2
3 is a cursed equilibrium. A bidder with xi =0knows the object is worth zero, and thus
b(0) = 0.A b i d d e r w i t h xi =1knows that the only time her bid matters is when bj = 2
3;s i n c e
she thinks that bj conveys no information about Bidder j￿s signal, a bidder with xi =1thinks the
value of the object is 2
3.B i d d e r i￿s perceived expected payoﬀ to any bid is zero, so b(0) = 0 and
b(1) = 2
3 is a fully-cursed equilibrium. Cursed and rational bidders with xi =0both bid 0, but
cursed bidders with xi =1bid 2
3, while rational bidders bid 4
5. Hence, in this example, the seller￿s
expected revenue is higher when bidders are rational than when they are cursed.17
We now turn to ￿rst price auctions, where the high bidder wins the auction and pays her bid.
In a symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium of the ￿rst-price auction, a Bidder i with signal Xi = xi





((1 − χ)vn(xi,y)+χr(xi)− bi)fY n
i (1)(y|Xi = xi),
where bj is the common equilibrium bidding function of bidders j 6= i and fY n
i (1)(y|Xi = xi) is the
density of Y n
i (1) conditional on Xi = xi. A necessary condition for equilibrium is that
dbn(xi)
dxi
= ((1 − χ)vn(xi,x i)+χr(xi) − bn(xi))
fY n
i (1)(xi|Xi = xi)
FY n
i (1)(xi|Xi = xi)
,


















































When χ =0 , bn(xi)=x − a
2, and bids are independent of the number of bidders. When
χ > 0, bids increase in n. Intuitively, when χ =1 , a bidder with signal xi values the object
17We believe that ￿in general￿ revenue increases with χ. We are familiar with no experimental tests on auctions
where revenues decrease with χ, which might be an additional useful test of our explanation of the winner￿s curse in
auctions.
21at r(xi)=xi, so the auction is one of private, but correlated, values. As n increases, bidders
bid more because they face increased competition. For a given s, the expected highest signal
E[Y n(1)|S = s]=s + n−1
n+1
a
2, and the seller￿s expected revenue in the n-bidder auction is







Like in the second-price auction, the seller￿s expected revenue is increasing in n. Bidders suﬀer the




2χ .W h e n χ =1 , n ≈ 3.5,s ob i d d e r ss u ﬀer the winner￿s
curse whenever n ≥ 4. In a second-price auction when χ =1bidders also suﬀer the winner￿s curse
whenever n ≥ 4.W h e n χ = 1
2,b i d d e r ss u ﬀer the winner￿s curse in a ￿rst-price auction when
n ≥ 6,w h i l et h e ys u ﬀer the winner￿s curse in a second-price auction when n ≥ 5.T h i s d i ﬀerence
re￿ects the fact that in a cursed equilibrium, as in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the second-price
auction raises more expected revenue than the ￿rst-price auction. In a cursed equilibrium, bids are
decreasing in a, just as in the rational case. When χ > χ ≡ 2n
(n−2)(n+1), again the seller￿s expected
revenue is increasing in a. Just as in second-price auctions, in a ￿rst-price auction with a large
number of bidders χ is close to zero, so the seller￿s expected revenue in large auctions is increasing
in a, as long as bidders are not completely rational.
Rather than analyze more general implications of cursed equilibrium in auctions, we conclude
this section by relating our analysis above to some of the large body of experimental evidence.
In an early experiment, Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) auctioned oﬀ jars of coins to student
subjects. In each auction, subjects could see the jar being auctioned, but did not know how many
coins it contained. The highest bidder paid her bid and received the paper-dollar equivalent of the
coins in the jar. Subjects also guessed how many coins each jar contained, and the subject whose
guess was closest to the true value won a cash prize. Whereas all of the jars actually contained
$8.00, the average winning bid was $10.01. However, the subjects￿ average estimate of the money
in the jar was only $5.13. Even though the subjects were on average too pessimistic about the
value of the money in the jars, they suﬀered the winner￿s curse, presumably because those with
high bids bid close to their estimates, rather than tempering their bids.
Kagel and Levin (1986) test a model nearly identical to our example above: the value of the



































.18 This bidding function diﬀers from that
derived in the example above only by the ￿nal term, which becomes small as xi increases above
s + a
2; we ignore this ￿nal term in most of our discussion below. Table 2 summarizes Kagel and
Levin￿s data on a large series of auctions (some series aggregate auctions with diﬀerent values of a,
n, s,a n ds).
Table 2: Common-Values Auctions (Kagel and Levin 1986)
n Obs π(χ =0 ) π(χ =1 ) πχ
3− 43 1 9 .51 3.25 3.73 0.92
41 84 .99 −0.75 4.61 0.07
41 46 .51 −3.82 7.53 0
41 98 .56 −0.12 5.83 0.31
42 36 .38 −2.24 1.70 0.54
51 85 .19 −1.90 2.89 0.32
5− 71 1 3 .65 −5.19 −2.92 0.74
61 84 .70 −10.11 1.89 0.19
6− 72 5 4 .78 −10.03 −0.23 0.34
72 65 .25 −8.07 −0.41 0.42
71 45 .03 −11.04 −2.74 0.48
The ￿rst column reports the number of bidders in each auction series. The second column reports
the number of auctions in each series. The third and fourth columns present the average equilibrium
pro￿ts ￿ the average winning bid less the average value of the object ￿ when χ =0and χ =1 ,
respectively.19 The fourth column contains subjects￿ actual average pro￿ts. The ￿fth column
provides estimates of χ given the subjects￿ behavior.20
Kagel and Levin￿s data are broadly consistent with positive χ, but not χ =1 .I n e v e r y
auction series but one, subjects￿ pro￿ts lie between the Bayesian-Nash and fully-cursed predictions.









χ=0(x) is the Bayesian-Nash bidding function and b
n
χ=1(x) is the fully-cursed bidding function, both of which
are presented in Kagel and Levin (1986).
19For xi > s −
a
2, since the bidding function for rational bidders cannot be solved analytically, Kagel and Levin








. As they note, this overstates bids for high signal
values and hence understates the diﬀerence between fully-cursed and rational bidding. As a result, this should bias
our estimate of χ downwards.
20To estimate χ, we use the fact that because the bidding function in a χ-cursed equilibrium is the χ-weighted
average of the fully-rational and fully-cursed bidding functions, bidders￿ pro￿ts in a χ-cursed equilibrium are also
the χ-weighted average of the fully-rational and fully-cursed pro￿ts. We then use Kagel and Levin￿s report of the
theoretical pro￿ts for rational and fully-cursed bidders, as well as subjects￿ actual pro￿ts. However, because of
the way that Kagel and Levin approximate the bidding function for high signals described in the last footnote, our
estimate of χ is biased downwards.
23Our estimates of χ are fairly consistent across auction series, with 7 of the 11 between 0.19 and
0.54. The average value of χ (weighted by the number of observations for each values) is 0.42.21
In this experiment, as in many others, when the number of bidders is small, average pro￿ts are
positive, but when the number of bidders is large, average pro￿ts are negative. Kagel and Levin
(1986) conclude that the larger the number of bidders, the further the subjects￿ bids from Nash
equilibrium. However, if we estimate χ separately for n ≤ 4 and n ≥ 5,w eg e te s t i m a t e sa r e0.39
and 0.46, respectively. Thus, while χ appears to be marginally higher for large n,t h ef a c tt h a t
the two estimates are so similar suggests that subjects￿ cursedness is not particularly sensitive to
n. As we showed in our example above, whatever χ, bidders suﬀer the winner￿s curse for large
enough n.
All said, cursed equilibrium seems to ￿t reasonably well how pro￿ts depend on the number of
bidders and the noisiness of bidders￿ signals, a. A further indication that the subjects exhibit cursed
behavior, which (unlike Table 2) includes bids from losing bidders, comes from Kagel and Levin￿s
(1986) estimate of the linear bidding function





where standard errors are reported below the regression coeﬃcients.22 Because the bidding function
in a cursed equilibrium is linear in neither a
2 nor in n, Kagel and Levin￿s estimated bidding function
is somewhat hard to interpret. But the coeﬃcient on a
2 is signi￿cantly less than the value of one
predicted by Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and bids are increasing in n, rather than decreasing as
21Kagel and Levin￿s (1986) Table 3 groups the data as a function of a and n;e s t i m a t i n gχ from this table yields
the results presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Common-Values Auctions (Kagel and Levin 1986)
na π(χ =0 ) π(χ =1 ) πχ
3 − 42 4 4 .52 −1.24 2.60 0.33
3 − 43 6 7 .20 −0.24 3.98 0.43
3 − 44 8 ,60 11.22 0.60 6.75 0.42
6 − 72 4 3 .46 −3.68 −1.86 0.75
6 − 73 6 3 .19 −8.51 −0.95 0.35
6 − 74 8 ,60 7.12 −12.31 0.60 0.34
With one exception, all of our estimates of χ lie between 0.33 and 0.43.W h e t h e r n ∈ {3,4} or n ∈ {6,7}, subjects￿
pro￿ts are increasing in a, as Bayesian Nash predicts. Since cursed equilibrium suggests that pro￿ts are increasing in
a as long as χ < χ ≡ 2n
(n−2)(n+1), the data are consistent with χ < 0.8 for n ∈ {3,4}. For n ∈ {6,7}, however, pro￿ts
are increasing in a only when χ < 0.35, which appears somewhat inconsistent with our estimates of χ in this case.
22The regression includes a subject-speci￿c and auction-speci￿c error term for each bid. Kagel and Levin also
estimate a bidding function including an intercept term and zi, but the estimated coeﬃcients on these variables are
insigni￿cant.
24predicted by Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Both results are consistent with cursed equilibrium.
Finally, we should note that in only 71% of auctions did the high-signal holder win. In a cursed
equilibrium, as in a Bayesian Nash, all of the auctions should have been won by the high-signal
holder, and that they were not suggests that subjects made errors in addition to those predicted
by cursed equilibrium, or that diﬀerent bidders were cursed to diﬀerent degrees.
Many other papers ￿nd evidence of the winner￿s curse. Lind and Plott (1991) show that the
winner￿s curse in Kagel and Levin￿s (1986) experiments is not due to any strategic eﬀects of limited
liability ￿ the fact that subjects who lost more than some initial endowment were removed from
the experiment. Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) report experiments using students and executives
from the construction industry; all but one of the executives had experience bidding in auctions.
They ￿nd that both types of subjects suﬀer the winner￿s curse, and that the curse the curse is
slightly stronger among the executives, albeit not signi￿cantly. Kagel, Levin, and Harstad (1995)
test the second-price auction with the same signal structure as Kagel and Levin (1986). Again,
they ￿nd that subjects￿ pro￿ts are less than the Nash prediction for all n, and that bidders suﬀer
the winner￿s curse when they are suﬃciently numerous. Using the same procedure for estimating χ
as we did for Kagel and Levin, we estimate χ =0 .36, which is fairly close to our estimate of 0.42 in
the ￿rst-price auction. However, Kagel and Levin￿s (1986) subjects, Kagel, Levin, and Harstad￿s
(1995) subjects do appear to be more cursed the larger n:w h e nn =4 , χ =0 .18,w h e nn =5 ,
χ =0 .27,a n dw h e nn ∈ {6,7}, χ =0 .42.
Avery and Kagel (1997) report experimental evidence on a simple two-bidder auction where
each bidder receives a signal Xi ∼ U[1,4],a n dui(x1,x 2)=x1 + x2; that is, the value of the
object is simply the sum of the two bidders￿ signals. The argument used above to show that
bi(xi)=( 1− χ)vn(xi,x i)+χr(xi) was an equilibrium of the second-price auction where applies
equally well to this model, and thus b(xi)=
5χ
2 +( 2− χ)xi is the symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium
of this auction. Avery and Kagel estimate the linear bidding function b(xi)=α + βxi.C u r s e d
equilibrium predicts that α = 5
2χ and β =2− χ.
Avery and Kagel divide their subjects, who are mostly undergraduate economics students, into
two groups. Inexperienced subjects have played only seven (unreported) practice auctions, and
their reported data cover 18 auctions. Experienced subjects are formerly inexperienced subjects
who have now participated in 25 auctions; their reported data cover 24 auctions. In this auction,
cursed equilibrium makes predictions about both parameters, α and β, and but without the data
t h e r ei sn oo b v i o u sw a yt oe s t i m a t et h eχ that best ￿ts the data. Table 4, however, compares the
25average values of α and β Avery and Kagel found for inexperienced and experienced subjects to
diﬀerent values of χ.
Table 4: Second-Price Auctions (from Avery and Kagel 1997)
χ =0 χ =0 .75 χ =1 Actual
Subjects αβ α β α β α β
Inexperienced 021 .875 1.25 2.51 2 .64 1.13
(n = 299) (0.68) (0.08)
Experienced 031 .875 1.25 2.51 1 .99 1.34
(n = 308) (0.35) (0.05)
From the table it can be seen that χ =1￿ts inexperienced subjects￿ behavior well, and χ =0 .75 ￿ts
experienced subjects￿ behavior. These estimates are roughly consistent with a couple of diﬀerent
formal best-￿t procedures. First, we minimize the distance between α and β and α(χ) and β(χ)
by minimizing the weighted sum






where z ∈ (0,1) is the relative weight placed on explaining α versus β. We ￿nd that χ = 1.74+11.46z
2+10.5z
for inexperienced subjects, yielding χ ∈ (0.87,1.06) for z ∈ (0,1),a n dχ = 1.28+8.67z
2+10.5z for experienced
subjects, yielding χ ∈ (0.64,0.80) for z ∈ (0,1).F o r z = 1
2, χ =1 .03 for inexperienced subjects,




β,w e￿nd χ =0 .97 for inexperienced subjects and χ =0 .74 for experienced subjects. Thus
inexperienced subjects behave very much like fully-cursed bidders, and experienced subjects appear
much closer to fully-cursed than uncursed.
5V o t i n g
A recent rational-choice literature on voting in elections and juries assumes that people vote with
a sophisticated understanding that they should predicate their votes on being pivotal. Because
a voter￿s vote only matters when she is pivotal, she should vote as if she is pivotal, even when
she suspects that she is not.23 Being pivotal can aﬀect a voter￿s preferences if she believes that
other voters have private information about the proper way to vote, information that is revealed
from the fact that she is pivotal. Hence, a sophisticated voter asks herself what information other
23See Razin (2000) for a version of the sophisticated-voter model when voters care not just about who wins an
election, but also about the margin of victory.
26voters would have to make her pivotal, and then how she wants to vote when she combines that
information with her own private information.
In a series of papers, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1998) explore the implications
of such sophisticated reasoning by voters. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) study a variant of
this reasoning in which uninformed voters strictly prefer abstaining to voting, because they realize
that if they are pivotal they are more likely to decide the election in favor of the wrong candidate.
By analogy to the winner￿s curse in auctions, they label this the ￿swing-voter￿s curse￿. The label
is apt, since less-than-fully-sophisticated voters may fall prey to such a curse much as bidders in
common-values auctions fall prey to the winner￿s curse. In this section we apply cursed equilibrium
to the model developed in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) of a jury that must decide whether
to convict a defendant of some crime. We discuss some general implications of cursedness in this
model, as well as how our results ￿tt h e￿ndings of McKelvey￿s and Palfrey￿s (1998) experimental
test of the model.
Aj u r yo fs i z eM ≥ 2 must decide whether to convict some defendant of some crime. Let ωG
be the state of the world where the defendant is guilty, and ωI be the state of the world where
the defendant is innocent, and suppose that jurors share the common prior ￿(ωG)=￿(ωI)=
1
2. Juror k receives a private signal sk ∈ {γ,ι}, correlated with the state of the world, with




. Signals are independent conditional on the state of the world.
Each juror k chooses an action ak ∈ {g,i},w h e r eg is a guilty vote and i an innocent vote. Let
σk : {γ,ι} → 4{g,i} be k￿s strategy, which maps her signal to a probability distribution over guilty
and innocent votes. Let nG denote the number of jurors who vote guilty, n−i
G denote the number
of jurors j 6= i who vote guilty, and nI = M − nG denote the number of jurors who vote innocent.
Let a ∈ {A,C} b et h eo u t c o m eo ft h ej u r yp r o c e s s ,w h e r eA denotes acquit and C convict. The
voting rule determines how the outcome depends on the jurors￿ votes. Under unanimous voting,
the defendant is convicted if nG = M; under majority voting, he is convicted if nG >n I. More




be the number of guilty votes needed to convict the defendant, so that
the defendant is convicted if nG ≥ N.
All jurors share the preferences
u(a|ωG)=
‰
q − 1 a = A
0 a = C
and u(a|ωI)=
‰
0 a = A
−qa = C,
where q ∈ (0,1) is a parameter measuring the voters￿ trade-oﬀs associated with either convicting
the innocent and acquitting the guilty. The higher q, the more jurors are bothered by convicting
27an innocent defendant relative to acquitting a guilty defendant. A juror prefers to convict if and
only if she thinks the probability that the defendant is guilty exceeds q.
Given that the two states, ωG and ωI, are equally likely, and that each private signal re￿ects
the true state with probability θ > 1
2, a juror believes that the defendant is guilty with probability
θ when her signal is γ and with probability 1−θ when her signal is ι. We shall assume throughout
that 1 − θ <q , so that a juror who receives an innocent signal never votes to convict based on
her information alone. In many applications, we shall consider the case of q = 1
2, so an individual
making a decision alone with only one signal would vote to convict if and only if the signal is guilty.
Because a juror￿s vote only matters if she is pivotal, it only matters if exactly N −1 other jurors
cast guilty votes. Thus a juror votes to convict if she thinks the probability of the defendant￿s
being guilty is at least q given her own signal and the event that N − 1 other jurors vote guilty.
To ￿nd a symmetric equilibrium, consider the strategy σk,w h e r e
σk(ak = g|sk)=
‰
1 sk = γ
σ sk = ι
,
where σ ∈ [0,1). Under strategy σk,J u r o rk votes guilty with probability one when she receives a
guilty signal, and votes guilty with probability σ when she receives an innocent signal. Feddersen
and Pesendorfer show a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this form always exists. Of
particular note is that the equilibrium often involves σ > 0, so that people with an innocent signal
vote guilty with positive probability. To see why this leads to σ > 0, note for instance that when
N
M > θ voters realize that even when the person is guilty they typically will not convict him based
on guilty votes alone; if all those with innocent signals were to vote innocent, then a person with
one of those innocent signals should realize that if she is pivotal it is almost surely the case that
the defendant is guilty. More generally, when q is low and N
M is high, proper voting requires some
of those with innocent signals to vote guilty.
In order for there to be a mixed-strategy χ-cursed equilibrium of the form described above with
σ ∈ (0,1), a juror must be indiﬀerent between voting guilty and innocent when she gets a ι signal.




G 6= N − 1 | ι
⁄
• u(g | n−i
G 6= N − 1)+ Pr
£
n−i






G 6= N − 1 | ι
⁄
• u(i | n−i
G 6= N − 1) + Pr
£
n−i
G = N − 1 | ι
⁄
• Vi(σ),
where Vg(σ) and Vi(σ) are the juror￿s perceived payoﬀs from voting guilty or innocent if she is
pivotal and receives an innocent signal. Because u(g | n−i
G 6= N − 1) = u(i | n−i
G 6= N − 1) ￿a
28voter only cares about her vote when it is pivotal ￿ u(g | ι)=u(i | ι) if and only if Vg(σ)=Vi(σ).
From this,
σ∗ =m a x
‰
0,
θz − (1 − θ)
θ − (1 − θ)z
￿
, where z =
￿
1 − q − θχ








When θ > 1
2 and q ≥ 1











That is, when χ is small, then those with innocent signals vote guilty with positive probability
when N is close enough to M, just as Feddersen and Pesendorfer found. More generally, cursed
equilibrium shares many features of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For example, when χ is suﬃciently
small, jurors with innocent signals sometimes vote guilty. Various comparative statics hold irre-
spective of χ. For all χ, ∂σ∗
∂q ≤ 0, meaning that the higher the burden of proof the jurors need to
convict the less likely they are to vote guilty. For all χ, ∂σ∗
∂N ≥ 0, meaning that the higher the
number of guilty votes needed to convict, the more likely the jurors are to vote guilty.
Although partially-cursed jurors may vote strategically, they underinfer one another￿s informa-
tion when they condition their votes on being pivotal. This aﬀects their voting strategy, and hence
the extent to which voting is eﬃcient ￿ the likelihood that an innocent defendant is acquitted
and a guilty defendant convicted. The formula above shows that ∂σ∗
∂χ ≤ 0, meaning that the more
cursed are jurors, the less likely are jurors with innocent signals to vote guilty. Because cursed
jurors are less inclined to infer from the fact that they are pivotal that others have received guilty
signals, cursedness causes jurors with innocent signals to be more likely to vote innocent. Indeed,
when χ =1 , voters simply vote their signals.
One of the striking results in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) is that ￿xing the number of
jurors, M, the probability of convicting an innocent person may increase as the number of guilty
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the probability that Juror i receives an innocent signal and is pivotal in the guilty and innocent states, respectively.
A cursed juror with an innocent signal who knows she is pivotal believes that the defendant is guilty with probability
Pg ≡ (1 − χ)
A(σ)
A(σ)+B(σ) + χ(1 − θ) a n di n n o c e n tw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yPi ≡ (1 − χ)
B(σ)
A(σ)+B(σ) + χθ. By observing that
Vg(σ)=Pi • (−q) and Vi(σ)=Pg • (q − 1), Vg(σ)=Vi(σ), we get the result presented in the text.
29votes needed for conviction, N, increases; this is because the probability with which a juror with
an innocent signal votes guilty may increase so much in response to a higher N that the odds of
convicting an innocent defendant increase. Cursedness mitigates this connection. While increasing
N can raise the probability of conviction even when χ > 0, it decreases the probability of conviction
for χ suﬃciently close to 1 because in that case jurors with innocent signals always vote innocent
irrespective of N.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) characterize the likelihood of acquitting a guilty defendant
and convicting an innocent defendant under the unanimity rule when the size of the jury becomes
arbitrarily large. Under the unanimity rule, an innocent defendant is convicted with probability
Pr[C|ωI]=[ ( 1− θ)+θσ∗]
M and a guilty defendant with Pr[A|ωG]=1−[(1 − θ)+θσ∗]
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Pr[C|ωI] is decreasing in χ,a n dPr[A|ωG] is increasing in χ: cursedness decreases the probability
of convicting an innocent defendant and increases the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant.
When χ >
1−q
θ , Pr[C|ωI]=0and Pr[A|ωG]=1 ;t h a ti s ,s u ﬃciently cursed jurors vote their signals,
so the defendant is never convicted.25
While in the context of juries comparing unanimity rules to majority rules is natural, in large-
scale elections it is of greater interest to compare intermediate cases where the share of votes needed
to pass a proposition or elect a candidate is between one half and one. While winning an election
typically requires a majority of votes, passing a proposition often requires a supermajority such as
2
3.26 To consider the role of cursedness in such contexts, we consider the limit as M becomes very
large and when N = kM, where k>1
2 is a ￿xed parameter representing the percentage of guilty





















0 for χ >
1−q
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which coincides with the results in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998).
26I nam u l t i - c a n d i d a t er a c ew i t ho n l yt w ov i a b l ec a n d i d a t e s ,r e q u i r i n gam a j o r i t yt oa v o i dar u n - o ﬀ amounts de
facto to requiring a super-majority.
30When χ <
1−q
θ , neither χ nor q aﬀects the equilibrium proportion of guilty votes in the limit.27
But both χ and q help to determine whether there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which voters
with innocent signals sometimes vote guilty. Indeed, in the limit for k<1, the election is fully
eﬃcient ￿ always acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty ￿ if and only if the above
mixed-strategy equilibrium exists. If the defendant is guilty, proportion θ+(1−θ)σ∗ of voters vote
guilty, and if the defendant is innocent, proportion (1−θ)+θσ∗ vote guilty. Voting is eﬃcient when
(1−θ)+θσ∗ <k<θ+(1−θ)σ∗. This holds for all values of θ > 1
2 and k<1 when χ <
1−q
θ .28 Note
that 1 − θ <k<θ holds even when σ∗ =0if θ >k .That is, if a higher percentage of voters get
guilty signals than are needed to convict, guilty votes by those with innocent signals are needed.
Given that whether σ∗ > 0 is the sole determinant when k>θ of whether voting in large
elections will be eﬃcient, it is of special note that the condition for σ∗ depends on χ but does not
depend on k. Since χ =0always guarantees that σ∗ > 0 when k>θ, this means that any threshold
election rule is eﬃcient for large elections when voters are suﬃciently uncursed. When χ >
1−q
θ , by
contrast, the election rule is eﬃcient if and only if θ >k>1
2; that is, the only election rules that
guarantee eﬃciency for suﬃciently cursed voters require conviction when voters vote naively.
A general principle is that voting mechanisms matter more for cursed than uncursed voters.
Uncursed voters vote in a sophisticated manner by adjusting their behavior to whatever mechanism
they face to assure as best they can that voting is eﬃcient. By contrast, very cursed voters who
vote based on their private information alone do not adjust their behavior to the mechanism to
achieve eﬃciency. An eﬃcient mechanism with cursed voters, therefore, needs to implement the
27The intuition for this independence from χ and q depends on the fact that in a mixed-strategy equilibrium a voter
must be indiﬀerent between voting innocent and voting guilty when she is pivotal and has an innocent signal. Recall
from an earlier footnote that a cursed voter with an innocent signal who knows he is pivotal believes that the defendant
is guilty with probability Pg ≡ (1−χ)
A(σ)
A(σ)+B(σ) +χ(1−θ) and innocent with probability Pi ≡ (1−χ)
B(σ)
A(σ)+B(σ) +χθ
,w h e r eA(σ) and B(σ) are the actual probabilities that a voter receives an innocent signal and is pivotal in the two
states. Since the voter is indiﬀerent between voting guilty and innocent only if Pi•(−q)=Pg •(q−1), these equations
imply that σ must be such that
A(σ)
B(σ) ∈ (0,1). Intuitively, if the voter￿s perceived probabilities ￿ and, hence, the
actual probabilities ￿ of the two states were not of the same order of magnitude, then she would strictly prefer



























B(σ) is a likelihood function describing the relative probability that a voter with an innocent signal is pivotal
in each of the two states; if the fraction being raised to the power M does not equal 1,t h e ni nt h el i m i t
A(σ)
B(σ) is either
in￿nite or zero. In fact, σ∗ is the value of σ that such that limN=kM→∞
A(σ)
B(σ) =1 .
28This can be proven by noting that when θ =1 , (1 − θ)+θσ
∗ =0and θ +( 1− θ)σ
∗ =1 ,a n dt h a tw h e nθ & 1
2,
(1 − θ)+θσ
∗ = θ +( 1− θ)σ
∗ = k. The result is then established by showing that (1 − θ)+θσ
∗ is strictly decreasing
in θ and θ +( 1− θ)σ
∗ is strictly increasing.
31right choice when voters vote naively. This suggests, in turn, that an eﬃcient voting mechanism
exists whenever there is a suﬃciently large number of voters whose ￿naive preferences￿ depend on
their private signals, so that aggregate voting behavior depends on whether the true state is that
the defendant is guilty or innocent.
The only experimental test of the Feddersen and Pesendorfer model of which we are aware is
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998), who study the laboratory behavior of students at Cal Tech. Subjects
were assigned randomly to groups with either 3 or 6 members. Each group was assigned with equal
probability to one of two urns, the ￿innocent￿ urn with 7 innocent balls and three guilty balls, or
the ￿guilty￿ urn with 3 innocent balls and 7 guilty balls.29 Subjects did not know to which urn
their group had been assigned, but each subject privately and independently drew a ball at random
(sequentially with replacement) from her group￿s urn. After observing her ball, each subject voted
either innocent or guilty. McKelvey and Palfrey￿s experiment corresponds to parameter values
of ￿(ωG)=￿(ωI)=.5,q= .5, and θ = .7 in the model outlined above. Diﬀerent groups faced
diﬀerent rules determining how their votes were aggregated into a decision. There were four diﬀerent
conditions: unanimous and majority rules in 3- and 6-person juries. That is, they ran four diﬀerent
combinations of M and N: (N,M)=( 2 ,3), (3,3), (4,6), and (6,6).30 Subjects received 50 cents
if their group￿s decision matched their urn and 5 cents if it did not.
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) analyze their data using quantal-response equilibrium (QRE), both
to test how well Feddersen and Pesendorfer￿s model explains behavior and to test how well QRE
explains subjects￿ errors. Quantal-response equilibrium posits that the subjects make mistakes with
some frequency, making a greater number of errors the less costly are those errors, but otherwise
play a best response to other subjects￿ behavior, taking into account the errors these others are
making.
In principle, one could de￿ne a χ-cursed quantal-response equilibrium by combining a cursed
misunderstanding of the relationship between actions and signals with the error structure embedded
in quantal-response equilibrium. While we do not conduct this (complicated) analysis, we use their
results to make some crude attempt to say whether cursedness adds any explanatory power the
results.31 Subjects faced eight situations￿each of the four voting rules, and each of the two possible
29We follow the authors in using the langauge of ￿guilty￿ and ￿innocent￿ in describing the experiment, although
the actual states described to the subjects were the more neutral terms ￿Red￿ and ￿Blue￿.
30For each of these four cases, McKelvey and Palfrey ran an additional condition, which we do not analyze, in
which subjects conducted a non-binding ￿straw poll￿ before voting.
31Subjects￿ exhibit a statistically-unlikely greater tendency to vote guilty on an innocent signal than innocent on a
guilty signal, even in the three-voter, majority-rule case where subjects simply should vote their signals. Fom this,
we infer that there was some ￿spillage￿ among conditions in which subjects primed to vote one way in the asymmetric
32signals.32 In six of the eight contingencies￿in all cases where the observed signal is γ, a n di nt h e
two majority-rule cases where the signal is ι￿predicted behavior does not depend on χ. The ￿rst
two lines of Table 5 supply some statistics on the two cases where does behavior depends on χ￿the
voters who have received innocent signals on three- and six-member unanimous juries .
T a b l e5 :J u r yV o t i n g( f r o mM c K e l v e ya n dP a l f r e y1998)
MNsσ∗(0) σ∗(1) σσ ∗∗ Errors Cost per Error
33ι .31 .00 .36 .00 36% .02
66ι .65 .00 .48 1.00 52% .03
Majority/ι .00 .00 .14 .00 14% .14
All/γ 1.00 1.00 .95 1.00 5% .20
Columns 4 and 5 report the shares of voters in the Bayesian Nash and cursed equilibria who
should vote guilty, and Column 6 shows the percentage of subjects, σ, who actually voted guilty.
As can be seen, too many people voted guilty in the three-person anonymous case￿the opposite of
the error predicted by cursedness. On the other hand, too few people voted guilty in the six-person
unanimous case, consistent with cursedness. Column 7 indicates how each individual subject should
have voted had she known how others were voting. Given that too many subjects voted guilty in
the three-person case, the optimal strategy for an individual voter would be to vote innocent for
sure; given that too many were voting innocent in the six-person case, the optimal strategy would
be to vote guilty for sure. Hence, Column 7 shows that 36% of subjects were voting erroneously
in the direction opposite of cursedness in the three-person case, and 52% of subjects were voting
erroneously in the direction predicted by cursedness in the six-person case, suggesting that subjects
were more prone to cursed errors than uncursed errors. For further comparison, the third row of
Table 5 lists together the other two innocent-signal conditions, indicating that only 14% of subjects
make errors in these cases. The fourth row shows average behavior by subjects getting guilty signals
in the four conditions, indicating that only 5% of subjects vote incorrectly in these cases.
Subjects make more errors in the one case where those errors are ￿cursed￿ than in any other
case. However, these error rates is complicated by the fact that some errors are costlier than others.
Column 9 shows the expected cost of each error, measured in terms of how much each error lowers
the expected likelihood of reaching the correct verdict. Since the expected cost of voting incorrectly
in the conditions represented in the last two rows is much higher than in the ￿rst two conditions,
cases did so in the symmetric conditions as well (or subjects were biased towards voting for red balls over blue).
32The number of votes taking place in each of this eight situations varied between 143 and 202; in the two rows
of Table 5 where we average across conditions we take the simple average of the conditions rather than weighting by
the number of subjects.
33the lower number of errors may merely re￿ect their costliness rather than the uncursed nature of the
error. Yet the expected cost of voting innocent in the six-person case is greater than the expected
cost of those voting guilty in the three-person case, which suggests that the greater number of these
cursed errors cannot be fully explained by their low cost.33
An alternative method of estimating subjects￿ cursedness in this experiment is by computing
the maximum-likelihood estimate of χ under the maintained hypothesis that almost nobody makes
any error except cursedness. In this case, the huge number of subjects voting incorrectly in the six
cases where cursedness should not aﬀect behavior are merely ￿￿ukes￿, and we look for the χ that
best ￿ts subjects￿ behavior in the two cases where the mixed-strategy played depends on χ. In this
case, the maximum-likelihood value of χ is .10.34 Because neither method of estimating χ is very
satisfying, and neither method yields a very high estimate of χ, we conclude that whatever support
McKelvey and Palfrey￿s voting data provide for cursedness is very weak.
6S i g n a l i n g
In this section, we brie￿y apply cursed equilibrium to two diﬀerent signaling contexts, starting with
classical simple signaling games. Because it causes the receiver to infer less from signals than she
should, it is natural to suppose that cursedness may make a high-quality type of sender unable to
separate herself from a low-quality type by sending a costly signal, and hence unwilling to send the
signal. This intuition is not, however, always valid: because a cursed receiver does not fully infer
that a sender who does not send a costly signal is a low type, cursedness may make a low type of
sender less desperate to mimic a high type and hence make the high type able and willing to reveal
herself by sending a costly signal.
To illustrate this, consider a situation where a sender is with equal probability one of two types,
t = b, (￿bad￿) and t = g (￿good￿). After learning her type, the sender can send one of two signals,
e = l (￿low￿) and e = h (￿high￿). A receiver infers the sender￿s type from her signal, where e pl and
e ph represent the receiver￿s beliefs about the probability that the sender is type g following signals
l and h. After observing the signal the receiver chooses an action a ∈ [0,1] and has utility function
33If instead we compared the expected cost of the error conditional on being pivotal, the diﬀerence would be more
dramatic: 19% vs. 6%, rather than 3% vs. 2%.
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34u(a,g)=−(1 − a)2 and u(a,b)=−a2.35 Hence, a receiver with beliefs e p about the sender￿s type
maximizes his expected utility −e p(1 − a)2 − (1 − e p)a2 by choosing a = e pl and a = e ph following
signals e = l and e = h.
We assume that there is a continuous, increasing function f : R → R and real numbers cb >
cg > 0 such that (presented in reduced form that integrates the receiver￿s optimal response of a = e p)
ub = ug = f(e pl) is the payoﬀ t ob o t ht y p e so fs e n d e ri ft h es i g n a ll is sent, while ub = f(e ph) − cb
and ug = f(e ph)−cg are the payoﬀs to the bad and good types of sender, respectively, if the signal
h is sent. Thus, both types of sender want the receiver to believe that she is the good type; the
signal h can potentially serve as a signal because it is more costly for the bad type than for the
good type.
Because cb >c g, any separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium must involve type g sending signal
h and type b sending l. For a separating equilibrium to exist, the good type must prefer to send h,
so that f(1)− cg ≥ f(0), and the bad type must prefer to send l,s ot h a tf(1) − cb ≤ f(0). Hence,
a separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists if and only if cg ≤ f(1) − f(0) ≤ cb.
When is there a separating χ-cursed equilibrium? In a separating equilibrium, because a χ-
cursed receiver believes that type g sends h with probability 1−
χ
2 and type b sends h with probability
χ
2,h ef o r m st h eb e l i e f se pl =
χ
2 and e ph =1−
χ
2. Hence, a separating χ-cursed equilibrium exists if






















=0 ,s ot h a t
no signaling can occur when the receiver is fully cursed. Intuitively, no sender would send a costly
signal that would not aﬀect the receiver￿s beliefs.36
While fully-cursed receivers always destroy the potential for signaling, however, less extreme
cursedness can create the potential for successful signaling. Indeed, if cb <f(1) − f(0),s ot h a tn o











in χ,t h e r ei ss o m eχ ∈ (0,1) such that there is a separating cursed equilibrium. Intuitively, if
the cost of being identi￿ed as the bad type is so high that the bad type prefers sending the costly
signal to being identi￿ed, then full separation is not compatible with Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
If the receiver is cursed enough that the bad type is just barely willing to behave diﬀerently than
the good type, then the good type will be willing to reveal herself.
We now turn to an example of signaling that we call a ￿the revelation game,￿ modeled after
politicians who feel constrained not to lie to voters, but who do not feel constrained to reveal the
35The action a can be thought of as an investment that the receiver ￿nds attractive if the sender is a good type
but unattractive if he is a bad type.
36While a separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be a separating cursed equilibrium, recall that Proposition
3 demonstrates that every pooling Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pooling χ-cursed equilibrium, for every value of χ.
35full truth. In the 1999-2000 American presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush has said
that he has never had an extramarital aﬀair, and that he has not used cocaine in the past 25 years.
But he refuses to say whether he used cocaine more than 25 years ago. Especially since Governor
Bush volunteered the precise number 25, fully rational voters probably should infer that Governor
Bush used cocaine 26 years ago. But what would cursed voters infer from his (non)report?
Suppose a sender is of some type t ∈ [0,1],w h e r et is a measure of her age the last time she
engaged in some unseemly activity. A receiver does not know t, but has uniform priors on [0,1].
The sender chooses a message m ∈ [0,1] ∪{S}: she either announces that she is some type in [0,1]
or chooses S, meaning she remains silent. After observing the sender￿s message, the receiver forms
beliefs about the sender￿s type; let Pm(t) be the receiver￿s beliefs about the probability that the
sender￿s type is less than t following the message m. We assume that the receiver picks an action
a(m) ∈ [0,1] to maximize the expectation of his payoﬀ −(a(m)−t)2. This means that the receiver
chooses the action that coincides with his expectation of the sender￿s type given her message. The
type t of sender￿s payoﬀsa r e−a(m) if m ∈ {t,S} and −a(m) − c if m/ ∈ {t,S}. Hence, she wants
the receiver￿s beliefs to be as low as possible, but she pays a cost of c if she misreports her type.
We assume that c>1, so no sender ever has incentive to misreport her type.
The most plausible Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this game is that all types reveal themselves
fully.37 What are the cursed equilibria? Suppose the sender follows the cutoﬀ strategy r ∈ [0,1],









so the sender prefers to reveal whenever t<1
2 +( 1− χ)r
2. Because the marginal type r must be
indiﬀerent between revealing and not revealing, r = 1
2 +( 1− χ)r
2,w h i c hi m p l i e sr = 1
1+χ. Such a
cutoﬀ strategy is optimal for the sender, since types t<rprefer revealing, while types t>rprefer
pooling.
When χ =0 , r =1 , and all types reveal. The intuition is familiar: the lowest type always
prefers to reveal herself. If only the lowest types reveal, then the lowest types who are supposed
to pool will also prefer revealing, since they will have types lower than the average of all pooling
37In fact, if we de￿ned the game such that the sender cannot misreport her type, then this would be the unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. But because we have not de￿ned cursed equilibrium for games where a player￿s action
space depends on her type, we could not apply cursed equilibrium to this game. In the conclusion, we discuss some
of the problems that accompany cursed equilibrium in such games. In the game as we have de￿ned it, there are other
perfect Bayesian equilibria. One is that each type of sender chooses the action S, and the receiver chooses a(S)= 1
2
and a(m)=1for m 6= S. In this equilibrium, no sender reveals her type because the receiver ￿punishes￿ any
announcement of the sender￿s types with the extreme action a =1 . This strategy does not survive other re￿nements
such as iterated weak dominance or the intuitive criterion￿the receiver should not beleive that the message m could
be sent by any type of sender other than t = m since any other type t
0 6= m could do better by announcing either
m = t0 or m = S, whatever the receiver￿s continuation strategy.
36types. For χ > 0, however, some types pool. Because the receiver mistakenly believes that some
types of sender who reveal pool, and that some types of sender who pool reveal, when the receiver
sees a sender who refuses to reveal her type he thinks that she has a lower type than she actually
does.
We conclude with an experiment by Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey (1989) that provides some
evidence for cursedness in a game very similar to the revelation game. Their game is inspired by
the American ￿lm industry, where movie distributors auction the rights to show ￿lms to movie-
theater operators. Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey report that over 90% of ￿lms are auctioned oﬀ
before they are shot. Theater owners dislike this practice, possibly because they suﬀer a winner￿s
curse on movies auctioned before being shot. Distributors privately informed about the quality of
their ￿lms pre-production who are obliged to reveal quality post-production may auction oﬀ bad
movies before production and good ones after, much as in the revelation game good types reveal
while bad types conceal. In Forsythe, Isaac and Palfrey￿s (1989) experiment, each of four sellers
was endowed with one unit of an object whose common value (in cents) to each of four bidders was
drawn from a uniform distribution on {1,2,...,125}. Each seller knew the value of her object, but
the bidders did not. The sellers chose whether to reveal the value of their objects to the bidders or
conceal them; a seller who revealed her value had to do so truthfully. Following this, the objects
were auctioned to the bidders using ￿r s t - p r i c ea u c t i o n s ,w h e r ee a c hb u y e rb i do ne a c ho ft h es e l l e r s ￿
items. Just as in the revelation game, there is a cutoﬀ χ-cursed equilibrium where sellers with
objects valued more than r =
125χ+1
1+χ reveal their values, while sellers with objects valued less than
r =
125χ+1
1+χ conceal their values. Intuitively, low-value sellers conceal the value of their objects
because cursed bidders mistakenly think that some high-value sellers conceal, causing them to bid
too high for objects whose values are concealed. When χ =0 , all sellers (except possibly ones with
the lowest possible valuation) reveal. When χ =1 , sellers with valuations under 63 conceal, and
those with valuations above 63 reveal. Each bidder bids her expectation of the valuation of each
seller￿s object, which is r for those sellers who conceal.
Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey ran 60 trials of this experiments with three groups of undergraduate
subjects; the ￿rst group participated in 16 trials, and the second and third groups participated in
22 trials. Table 6 summarizes the data.
37Table 6: Revelation Game (from Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey 1989)
Group Sellers Conceal Value Conceal Bid Conceal χ
All 240 85 31 39 0.44
Experienced 120 32 23 27 0.27
Experienced* 72 12 11 19 0.17
The ￿rst row of the table shows the data for all sellers. For objects whose value was revealed,
the winning bid was always approximately equal to the value of the object. Columns 2 and 3
show that 85 of 240 sellers (35%) concealed the value of their objects. For sellers who concealed,
the average value of their objects was 31, but the average winning bid was 39. Hence buyers
suﬀered a winner￿s curse, paying an average of 8 cents more than the value of the objects they
won. There are two natural ways to estimate χ from the data, one from the average winning bid
and one from the average value of the objects concealed. Consider the data from the ￿rst row
and suppose that the sellers follow a cutoﬀ strategy￿revealing when their values were high and
concealing otherwise. Then because the average value of the sellers￿ objects is 31,s e l l e r sw o u l d
be revealing when their objects were worth more than 61 and concealing otherwise. Then since in
equilibrium 61 = r =
125+χ
1+χ , χ ’ 0.83; that is, sellers who thought that bidders were cursed with
χ =0 .83 would reveal with values over 61 and conceal otherwise. If sellers were following this
strategy, however, then cursed bidders would bid an average of 61, far more than the 39 that they
actually bid. The other method of estimating χ is to assume that cursed bidders believe that sellers
follow a cutoﬀ strategy, and estimate χ from the average winning bid. In this case, χ ’ 0.44.I n
T a b l e6 ,w ep r e s e n te s t i m a t e so fχ using the second of these methods since it corresponds better to
bidder behavior as well as to seller behavior with the notable exception of a few outlying high-value
objects whose values were concealed in early rounds of the experiment: 68 of 88 sellers (77%)w i t h
values less than 39 concealed , and 17 of 152 (11%) of sellers with values more that 39 concealed;
by contrast, only 74 of the 128 (58%)o ft h es e l l e r sw i t hv a l u e sl e s st h a n61 and 11 of the 112 (10%)
sellers with values greater than 61 concealed. Thus, given bidders￿ behavior, 37 of 240 sellers (15%)
made mistakes: the 20 with objects worth less than 39 who revealed, and the 17 with objects worth
more than 39 who concealed. In other words, those sellers whose objects were worth less than 39
and revealed had objects with signi￿cantly higher valuations than those sellers with objects worth
less than 39 who concealed.38
38In fact, seller behavior is better described by a simple step rule: sellers with the lowest valued concealed; sellers
with intermediate values conealed half of the time; and sellers with high values revealed. 43 of 44 sellers with objects
valued less than 25 concealed, and the average value of their objects was 14;t h ev a l u eo ft h eo b j e c to ft h el o n es e l l e r
who revealed was 16. 31 of 58 sellers (53%) with values between 25 and 49 concealed, and the average value of their
38The second row of the table describes only those subjects who have already participated in 10
trials or more ￿ trials 11 to 16 for the one group that participated in 16 trials, and trials 11 to
22 for the other two groups. 27 percent of sellers concealed the value of their objects; the average
value of these sellers￿ objects was 23, and the average winning bid was 27. Thus even experienced
bidders suﬀered a winner￿s curse, albeit half of what it was in the aggregate data. Again, if cursed
bidders in these ￿nal rounds believed that sellers followed a cutoﬀ strategy, concealing if their value
w a sl e s st h a nr and revealing otherwise, then from the data r =2 7 ,s oχ ’ 0.27. Seller behavior
is very close to this as 20 of the 22 sellers (91%) with objects worth 27 or less concealed, and 12 of
98 sellers (12%) of sellers with objects worth more than 27 concealed.
Finally, because in one of the three groups a single subject won 16 of the 20 of the auctions
where the seller concealed her value, bidding an average of 35, the third row excludes this subject￿s
group from the pool of experienced subjects. This time, only 17% of sellers concealed the value of
their objects. The winner￿s curse is larger than for experienced subjects, as the average value of
sellers￿ objects was 11, while the average winning bid was 19. Thus the winner￿s curse was larger.
For this group, χ ’ 0.17.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We believe that cursed equilibrium can provide insight in many additional domains. One is in
organizational and sequential decision-making, where we believe that cursedness may capture a form
of exaggerated fear that some parties may have of putting other parties in charge of decisions, under-
appreciating the fact that unanticipated future decisions by others may be based on unanticipated
information. Consider, for instance, a grand jury that must decide whether to indict some defendant
of a crime. If the defendant is indicted, the case proceeds to trial where a jury hears the evidence
and decides whether to convict the defendant. In this case, a suﬃciently cursed grand jury that is
not yet convinced of the defendant￿s guilt may be too reluctant to indict. This is because it fears
that the jury will convict when the defendant is innocent, even though it should realize that the
jury only convicts if it has strong evidence that the defendant is guilty. Similarly, principals in
organizations may be reluctant to delegate decisions even to parties whose interests coincide with
objects was 34; the average value of the 27 who revealed was 36. Finally, 11 of the 138 sellers (8%) with objects
worth at least 50 concealed (8%), and the average value of their objects was 88; the average value of the 127 who
revealed was 86. The fact that within each of these groups the average value of the objects of sellers who concealed
roughly equals the average value of the objects of those sellers who revealed suggests that sellers decisions to reveal
did not depend on their objects￿ values.
39their own out of fear that the these other parties would make diﬀerent decisions than they would,
underappreciating how often those diﬀerent decisions re￿ect superior information.39
Many applications of cursed equilibrium point to limitations and problems with the solution
c o n c e p ta sw eh a v ed e ￿ned it, and we conclude by discussing some of these shortcomings and
possible extensions of the solution concept. One limitation of cursed equilibrium is that we have
only de￿ned it in games where each player￿s action space is independent of her type. In games
without such independence, cursed equilibrium should presumably be de￿ned such that players
do not assign positive probability to a type playing an action that is impossible for that type. A
problem with this approach, however, is that a cursed equilibrium in the game where an action is
i m p o s s i b l ef o rat y p eo fap l a y e rm i g h td i ﬀer from a cursed equilibrium in the related game where
that same action is possible, but strictly dominated, for that type.
This problem, in turn, suggests a modi￿ed de￿nition in which we assumed that no player thinks
that any type of any other player plays a strictly dominated action in equilibrium. More generally,
cursed equilibrium could be revised to incorporate the notion that the worse an action is for a
type, the less likely other players think that type is to take that action. Developing a new concept
incorporating this notion seems important both intuitively and for practical application, but would
raise new problems such as determining how to measure and compare how irrational a given action
is for diﬀerent types of a player, and precisely how to restrict beliefs as a function of the degree of
irrationality associated with a rule. And the enterprise would be inherently limited, since the very
notion of cursed equilibrium is meant to capture limits to the degree to which people think through
the relationship between others￿ relevant information and their behavior.
Perhaps a more urgent direction for developing the idea of cursed equilibrium concerns a more
important limitation to our current de￿nition. The notion of cursed equilibrium is meant to capture
a general intuition that people tend to underappreciate the relationship between others￿ actions and
the information these others have at the time they take those actions. Yet our formal de￿nition
39To illustrate with a simple principal-agent model, let Ω = {ω1,ω2} be the set of possible states of the world,
where the principal and agent share the common prior ￿(ω1)=￿(ω2)= 1
2. If the principal invests in an experiment,
the agent learns which is the true state, otherwise the agent learns nothing about the state. Once the agent has
received his information, he chooses an action a ∈ {a1,a 2,a 3}. The principal and the agent share the common payoﬀs
u(a1,ω1)=u(a2,ω2)=2 , u(a1,ω2)=u(a2,ω1)=−2,a n du(a3,ω)=1for each ω. That is, the agent attempts to
match action ai to state ωi, while the safe action a3 pays one in each state. Then if the agent learns the true state,
he matches his action to the state, earning a payoﬀ of 2. If the agent does not learn the state, he chooses a1, earning
ap a y o ﬀ of 1. A rational principal therefore prefers that the agent learn the true state. But if the principal is cursed,






=2 ( 1−χ),which exceeds one only
when χ < 1
2.T h u s a s u ﬃciently cursed principal prefers that the agent not learn the true state and hence take the
safe action, because she innappropriately fears that the ￿risky￿ action following the experiment might mismatch the
state.
40makes an arti￿cial distinction between private information represented by a type space in a Bayesian
game and private information that is not represented by the type space. In sequential games, for
instance, our de￿nition assumes that Player 3 does not fully appreciate how Player 2￿s actions
depend on Player 2￿s types, but does fully appreciate how Player 2￿s actions depend on any actions
that Player 1 might take that Player 2 observes but Player 3 does not. We hope to move towards a
more complete notion of cursed equilibrium which allows for ￿cursedness￿ over more general types
of unobservable information that others have.40
Many other generalizations of cursed equilibrium seem important to add more realistic variation
in the degree of ￿cursedness￿ in diﬀerent situations. For instance, we ￿nd it intuitive that players are
less likely to ignore the informational content of given actions by other players when they have not
actually observed those actions than when they have; observing actions seems likely to induce more
strategic interpretations. This might imply that the reactions by players to the observed actions in
certain sequential games are ￿less cursed￿ than they would be in corresponding simultaneous-move
games. For example, Dekel and Piccione (2000) show in a rational model of binary voting that the
set of informative equilibria is not aﬀected by whether voters vote sequentially or simultaneously.
While we believe the same equivalence holds with cursed equilibrium as we have de￿n e di nt h i s
paper, a better model may have a cursed voter understand the relationship between other voters￿
signals and votes better when she can observe their votes than when she cannot, leading to more
rational voting in the sequential than in the simultaneous-move voting procedure.
A ￿nal generalization of cursed equilibrium, manifestly needed to more tightly ￿tt h ed a t a ,
is to allow diﬀerent players to be cursed to diﬀerent extents. Such heterogeneity is the natural
interpretation of many of the experiments cited above, for instance; while we believe that in many
cases behavior was usefully characterized by positing a uniform χ > 0 across subjects, the behavior
would be even better described by allowing for heterogeneity.41
40The diﬀerent treatment of ￿exogenous￿ and ￿endogenous￿ private information seems not only intuitively and
psychologically wrong to us, but creates some highly arti￿cial diﬀerences in predictions based on the way a game
is formally written down. In particular, insofar as a Bayesian game where one player has private information can
be rewritten as an alternative Bayesian game where a ￿ctitious player is added who takes actions observable by the
privately-informed player, our de￿nition of cursed equilibrium is not robust.
41In fact, we suspect that in some circumstances heterogenous cursedness may lead to some qualitatively-diﬀerent
predictions than homogenous cursedness.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1Consider the alternative game (A,T,p,uχ), where (A,T,p) are all the
same, but u is replaced by
u
χ




The utility function of type tk of Player k is the χ-weighted average of her actual utility function
and her ￿average utility function￿, averaged over all possible types of her opponents. σ is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of G
χ if for each Player k and each type tk ∈ Tk, and each a∗














































































[χσ−k(a−k|tk)+( 1− χ)σ−k(a−k|t−k)]uk(ak,a −k;tk,t −k).
42Thus if σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G
χ, it is also a cursed equilibrium of G.B e c a u s e G
χ
is ￿nite, it has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and so G has a cursed equilibrium. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2If each type tk of each player k￿s expected payoﬀ from playing ak when
the other players play a−k in the χ-virtual game G
χ is independent of χ, then the result follows since
the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of G
0 = G coincides with the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of
G



















































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3Suppose that σ is strategy pro￿le such that for each Player k there exists






















43which does not depend on χ. Therefore, whatever χ, ak maximizes Player k￿s expected payoﬀ given
that players j 6= k play σ−k(a−k|t−k),s oσ is a χ-cursed equilibrium for every χ ∈ [0,1]. ¤
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